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MOVEMENT JUDGES
BRANDON HASBROUCK*
Judges matter. The opinions of a few impact the lives of many. Judges romanticize
their own impartiality, but apathy in the face of systems of oppression favors the
status quo and clears the way for conservative agendas to take root. The lifetime
appointments of federal judges, the deliberate weaponization of the bench by reactionary opponents of the New Deal and progressive social movements, and the
sheer inertia of judicial self-restraint have led to the conservative capture of the
courts. By contrast, empathy for the oppressed and downtrodden renders substantive justice possible and leaves room for unsuccessful litigants to accept unfavorable
outcomes. But some judges—movement judges—bring more to the bench than just
empathy, raging against systemic injustice with an understanding of its burdens on
real human lives. This Article argues that we need movement judges to realize the
abolitionist and democracy-affirming potential of the Constitution. Although the
judiciary is often described as the “least democratic” of the three branches of government, it has the potential to be the most democratic. With movement judges, the
judiciary can become a force for “We the People.”
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INTRODUCTION
“We must not pretend that the countless people who are routinely
targeted by police are ‘isolated.’ They are the canaries in the coal mine
whose deaths, civil and literal, warn us that no one can breathe in this
atmosphere.”
—Justice Sonia Sotomayor, 20161
In the spring of 2021, I applied to become a federal judge on the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.2 After multiple rounds of interviews,
I was extended an invitation to meet with Senators Tim Kaine and
Mark Warner. During the final round of interviews with Senators
Kaine and Warner, Senator Kaine asked me what kind of judge I
would be. I responded, “A movement judge.” I told the Senators that
1

Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2071 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Obviously, I was not among those whose names were forwarded to President Biden.
Senators Kaine and Warner may have had any number of reasons for that choice, but I
can’t imagine my age wasn’t a factor in the decision. At 34, I would have been the youngest
nominee ever to the Fourth Circuit.
2
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I understood a movement judge to be a jurist who understands that
our Constitution contains the democracy-affirming tools we need to
dismantle systems of oppression and to achieve true equality for all
people. I wanted to be not just a judge who would reliably interpret
the laws and Constitution in a broad framework to protect the rights
of individuals, but a judge who would consistently bear in mind the
consequences cases have for individuals’ real lives beyond the courtroom. I wanted to be a judge who would simultaneously consider both
the people who must live with a decision and its collateral legal
effects. I wanted to bring an abolition constitutionalist legal philosophy to the bench, focusing on the Constitution’s potential to dismantle modern systems of oppression—particularly those deriving
from slavery—in order to promote substantive liberty and justice and
create a more humane and democratic society.3
Courts matter. Judges without a serious commitment to preserving democratic processes and institutions can clear the way for
political actors to preserve power irrespective of the will of the
people.4 In Florida, after voters overwhelmingly passed a state constitutional amendment to allow felons to vote after their release from
prison, the legislature responded by limiting voting to those who had
finished paying all fines, fees, and restitution.5 While voters challenged this law as an unconstitutional poll tax, the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled against them, effectively preventing the participation of hundreds of thousands of people that Floridians had voted
to enfranchise.6 The Supreme Court’s refusal to intervene in that case
and the political gerrymandering cases fits with the general pattern of
3 See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Supreme Court, 2018 Term—Foreword: Abolition
Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7–10 (2019) (providing a succinct explanation of
abolition constitutionalism in the context of prison abolition).
4 See, e.g., Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506–07 (2019) (declining to
address partisan political gerrymandering even though it flouts the will of the people
because such claims present “political questions beyond the reach of the federal courts”).
5 See Lawrence Mower & Langston Taylor, In Florida, the Gutting of a Landmark
Law Leaves Few Felons Likely to Vote, PROPUBLICA: ELECTIONLAND (Oct. 7, 2020),
https://www.propublica.org/article/in-florida-the-gutting-of-a-landmark-law-leaves-fewfelons-likely-to-vote [https://perma.cc/5LG9-LRWM] (“Amid the confusion, the one
certainty is that Florida’s Republican governor and Legislature have tamped down the
felon vote . . . .”).
6 See Jones v. Governor of Fla., No. 20-12003-AA, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 22403 (11th
Cir. July 1, 2020) (granting a stay of the district court’s injunction without opinion); Nina
Totenberg, Supreme Court Deals Major Blow to Felons’ Right to Vote in Florida, NPR
(July 17, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/07/17/892105780/supreme-court-deals-majorblow-to-ex-felons-right-to-vote-in-florida [https://perma.cc/D2UA-JFMT] (“But earlier this
month, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals, without explanation and two months after the
court of appeals decision, stopped Hinkle’s order [a preliminary injunction against
enforcement of the restriction] from going into effect.”).
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rights-restrictive decisions in voting cases.7 As Justice Kagan noted in
her dissent to Rucho v. Common Cause, in which the majority deemed
the matter of political gerrymandering a nonjusticiable political question, “[p]art of the Court’s role in [our system of government] is to
defend its foundations.”8 But the Roberts Court and lower courts following its lead consistently abdicate that responsibility. Even worse,
the Roberts Court has taken to using the shadow docket to advance
anti-democratic decisions without the scrutiny and consideration of
the Court’s typical rulings.9 With such a strong anti-democratic streak,
it should come as no surprise that the courts fail to protect individual
rights and frustrate legislatures’ efforts to do so.
Judges are supposed to enforce the law as it is written and remain
impartial.10 But the outcome of a particular case depends on the facts
presented, and the law is not always clear.11 What sources and experiences a judge draws on in such situations determines what kind of
judge they will be. When the judiciary is homogenous in appearance
and philosophy, the law is crafted to serve the ruling class: white
affluent America.12 But the “fundamental forms of social misery in
American society neither can be adequately addressed nor substantially transformed within the context of existing legal apparatus struc7 See, e.g., Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321 (2021) (holding that
Arizona’s restrictive out-of-precinct voting and ballot collection statutes did not violate the
Voting Rights Act); Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (finding the coverage
formula in section 4 of the Voting Rights Act to be unconstitutional).
8 See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2525 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
9 See Wis. Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm’n, 142 S. Ct. 1245, 1251 (2022)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Despite the fact that summary reversals are generally
reserved for decisions in violation of settled law, the Court today faults the State Supreme
Court for its failure to comply with an obligation that, under existing precedent, is hazy at
best.”).
10 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing the role of the
judiciary in the United States Constitution). But see SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, AM. CONST.
SOC’Y, A RIGHT-WING ROUT: WHAT THE “ROBERTS FIVE” DECISIONS TELL US ABOUT
THE INTEGRITY OF TODAY’S SUPREME COURT 16 (2019), https://www.acslaw.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/04/Captured-Court-Whitehouse-IB-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/
RB5D-ABLS] (“[M]oney, influence, and partisanship, rather than objective legal analysis
and interpretation, are reshaping some of the most important areas of the law in the
United States.”).
11 See Louis Fisher, Methods of Constitutional Interpretation: The Limits of Original
Intent, 18 CUMB. L. REV. 43, 44 (1987) (stating that law is “shaped by fundamental social
and economic changes and by the interactions among all three branches of government”).
12 See Jeff Guo, Researchers Have Discovered a New and Surprising Racial Bias in the
Criminal Justice System, WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/wonk/wp/2016/02/24/researchers-have-discovered-a-surprising-racial-bias-in-thecriminal-justice-system [https://perma.cc/2R6S-RP58] (“For a nation as diverse as the
United States, the judiciary is quite male and white. In theory, this shouldn’t matter. . . . In
practice, of course, it’s much messier. People can’t help but see the world through the lens
of their own experiences.”).
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tures.”13 To actualize abolition democracy—the ambitious project of
creating the fresh institutions necessary to achieve lasting racial
equality14—American courts cannot whitewash the American people.
Judges must turn their attentions to the people and see them in living
color. Doing so is central to movement judging.
Movement judges can serve as a counterweight to the conservative legal project’s influence. Where possible, a movement judge must
seek consensus for decisions that protect marginalized communities
and affirm democratic principles, relying on a variety of jurisprudential bases from equitable principles to critical originalism.15 Rather
than simply believing in the power of law to build a better world, as a
progressive judge does, a movement judge must be repulsed by inequity and must heartily dissent when the majority creates it.16 Equity
requires that all injuries have a remedy—including slavery and its
progeny—and that justice not be done in half measures. The complete
remedy for our country’s history of subordination is the establishment
of abolition democracy. The movement judge must critique precedent
and champion the dismantling of oppressive regimes for a better and
just society. This requires the movement judge to shatter insular
thinking and seek answers from historically repressed communities.17
Those communities recognize the kinds of judges they need, and if we
listen, we can hear them speaking:
13 Cornel West, The Role of Law in Progressive Politics, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1797, 1797
(1990).
14 See generally W.E.B. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA: TOWARD A
HISTORY OF THE PART WHICH BLACK FOLK PLAYED IN THE ATTEMPT TO RECONSTRUCT
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 1860–1880, at 289 (Transaction Publishers 2013) (1935)
(describing how, during Reconstruction, “[a]bolition-democracy demand[ed] for Negroes
physical freedom, civil rights, economic opportunity and education and the right to vote”);
ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ABOLITION DEMOCRACY: BEYOND EMPIRE, PRISONS, AND TORTURE
(2005) (applying Du Bois’s vision of a racially just society to evaluate modern systemic
injustices).
15 See Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, Language Disenfranchisement in Juries: A Call for
Constitutional Remediation, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 811, 841 (2014) (“Critical Originalism is the
melding of anti-subordination deconstruction principles of Critical Race Theory with the
interpretive methodology of Originalism Theory.”). This consensus building is apparent in
Justice Gorsuch’s opinion for the Court in Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731
(2020).
16 See Linda Greenhouse, The Truth Teller of the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (June 17,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/17/opinion/justice-sonia-sotomayor-supremecourt.html?smid=url-share [https://perma.cc/8VSD-53SH] (highlighting Justice
Sotomayor’s dissent in Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016), as an example of an opinion
“calling attention to the world beyond the four corners of a particular legal dispute”).
17 See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations,
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 325 (1987) (advocating for critical scholars to heed the
“actual experience, history, culture, and intellectual tradition of people of color in
America”).
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FIGURE 118

Movement law informs the movement judge. Movement law, as
distinct from movement lawyering, is the scholarly construction of
legal theories in solidarity with collective struggle, such as Black Lives
Matter or labor organizing.19 Movement law is “situated within twin
aspects of our current moment: the increasingly clear failures of
neoliberal law and politics and the surge of social movement activity
and grassroots organizing.”20
Movement judges, then, are receptive to the arguments of movement lawyering.21 For example, when Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued
for gender equality before the Supreme Court, Justice Thurgood
Marshall consistently sided with her anti-discrimination arguments.22
Likewise, Chief Judge Roger Gregory of the Fourth Circuit Court of
18 Equal Justice Mural Project,
FUTURE HIST. NOW (2021), https://
www.futurehistorynow.org/projects/equal-justice-mural [https://perma.cc/3K8L-B9ES]
(depicting a mural in Annapolis, Maryland).
19 See Amna A. Akbar, Sameer M. Ashar & Jocelyn Simonson, Movement Law, 73
STAN. L. REV. 821, 825–26 (2021).
20 Id. at 847–48.
21 This is not to say that movement judges must have been movement lawyers. See id.
at 826 (distinguishing movement law from movement lawyering).
22 See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357
(1979); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
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Appeals reliably scrutinizes the behavior of government and private
entities to ensure strict compliance with environmental statutes when
environmental advocates bring suits in the Fourth Circuit.23 Even
outside a movement judge’s personal experience as an advocate or
member of a marginalized community, they will find the advocacy of
movement lawyers more persuasive than their peers on the bench will.
Movement judging need not rely on convoluted interpretations of
laws and the Constitution. The Constitution already contains the
crowning achievements of the abolitionist movement: the
Reconstruction Amendments. While past precedents have twisted
these Amendments into poor shadows of their intended functions,
judges can look to the original meanings of key phrases to enforce
powerful protections of individual rights.24 The inertia of stare decisis
discourages this reevaluation, but there is no good reason to allow
respect for precedent to be limited to a one-way ratchet against individual rights. After all, reactionary judges routinely discard long23 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 899 F.3d 260, 266 (4th Cir. 2018)
(vacating pipeline permits because agency decisions were arbitrary and capiricious); Treacy
v. Newdunn Assocs., LLP, 344 F.3d 407, 417 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that a private
company violated the Clean Water Act by draining wetlands on its property because the
Army Corps was able to assert jurisdiction over the wetlands); Sierra Club v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng’rs, 981 F.3d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 2020) (granting a stay of the Corps’s
verification that a pipeline project met criteria for a nationwide permit because that
verification was likely issued in contravention of applicable law).
24 See, e.g., James Gray Pope, Mass Incarceration, Convict Leasing, and the Thirteenth
Amendment: A Revisionist Account, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1465, 1510 (2019) (“Republican
members of Congress also held that the Amendment prohibited the infliction of servitude
as punishment for offenses so minor as to make it improbable that servitude had actually
been imposed to punish the particular ‘crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted.’”); Robert J. Kaczorowski, Congress’s Power to Enforce Fourteenth Amendment
Rights: Lessons from Federal Remedies the Framers Enacted, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 187,
205 (2005) (“[T]he framers of the Fourteenth Amendment asserted that the Thirteenth
Amendment determined that the status of all Americans . . . is that of freemen, which they
equated with . . . United States citizenship. The framers . . . also asserted that the
[Fourteenth] Amendment delegated to Congress the power to . . . define and enforce the
rights of United States citizenship.”); Michael Kent Curtis, Historical Linguistics, Inkblots,
and Life After Death: The Privileges or Immunities of Citizens of the United States, 78 N.C.
L. REV. 1071, 1089 (2000) (“[I]n the thirty-five years or so before the 1868 ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment, common usage often referred to Bill of Rights liberties as
‘privileges,’ ‘immunities,’ or ‘rights’ of Americans or of citizens of the United States.”);
Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408,
480 (2010) (“[T]he orthodox view of due process rights in 1866, as evidenced by judicial
decisions at both the state and federal level, would almost certainly have included at least
the vested rights version of substantive due process and most likely the general law reading
as well.”); Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty, and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507, 546 (1991) (“The debates in the Thirty-Ninth
Congress over the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 confirm that
the constitutional right to protection was understood to include protection against private
violence.”).
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standing precedent in the service of corporate and police authority,
unconcerned with jurisprudential norms that might limit their project.25 Movement judges can bring abolition constitutionalism to bear
in the service of true equality under law.
This Article is the first to describe a movement judge and
advance the argument that we need movement judges. A movement
judge is more than just a progressive judge. Where the progressive
judge takes comfort in the belief that the law can work genuine
improvements in people’s lives, the movement judge recognizes the
barriers to significant change. Where the progressive judge trusts in
judicial norms to eventually bring about a more just society, the movement judge engages in the hard work of shifting fundamental understandings of how the law operates. Where the progressive judge is
committed to progressive constitutionalism, the movement judge is
committed to abolition constitutionalism. In some cases, that favors
gradually shifting precedents, but in others, such a fundamentally different constitutional vision requires upsetting stare decisis. This
Article will explore the need for movement judges and their potential
for promoting transformational change in the justice system.
The Biden Administration is making strides to appoint more
diverse judges to the federal bench.26 Biden’s nominees to appellate
courts are a marked departure from the usual blend of BigLaw and
prosecutors, with picks including public defenders, labor organizers,
and civil rights advocates.27 Neither trend guarantees that Biden’s
nominees will be movement judges, though they both increase the
likelihood. While shooting in the right direction is a good start, aiming
at the target would be better. If the President and his allies in the
Senate (or their successors) really want to use the judiciary to advance
abolition democracy, they should center the question of whether their
nominees will be movement judges. A confirmation process retooled
to prioritize judges with an understanding of the Constitution as a
25 See Thomas J. Molony, Taking Another Look at the Call on the Field: Roe, Chief
Justice Roberts, and Stare Decisis, 43 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 733, 753–54 (2020)
(discussing key antitrust and qualified immunity decisions that benefited such corporate
and police interests).
26 Mark Sherman & Darlene Superville, Biden’s Judges: More Diverse and More of
Them, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 2, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-ussupreme-court-8f20d7cd2768ec028de1c29e89a9d9e4 [https://perma.cc/3BHX-EP33]
(“[T]he nominees Biden has put forward so far [are] more diverse racially, by gender and
legal experience than were Trump’s picks . . . . They include public defenders, civil rights
lawyers and attorneys for organized labor . . . .”).
27 See Tierney Sneed, Inside Democrats’ Quest to Nominate Judges Who Break the ExProsecutor Mold, CNN (July 30, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/07/28/politics/bidenjudicial-nominations-public-defenders-professional-diversity/index.html [https://perma.cc/
XFV9-XK99].
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document containing the seeds of abolition democracy is essential to
appointing them. This Article aims to provide the blueprint for that
project.
Part I begins by discussing the present crisis of the judiciary. This
Part explores the Supreme Court’s anti-democratic jurisprudence as
well as that of lower courts to illustrate the crisis’s insidious nature.
Part II discusses movement law and further highlights the potential
for movement judges to stand in solidarity with movements including
Black Lives Matter, abolition, and environmental justice. Part III
begins with an exploration of what it means to be a movement judge,
beginning with a description and proceeding to contrast movement
judging with the concept of progressive judging. It then proceeds to
discuss several movement judges, both past and present, on the
Supreme Court, lower federal courts, and state courts. Part III concludes with a discussion of abolition constitutionalism to highlight the
transformative potential of this legal philosophy in the hands of movement judges. Although the judiciary is often described as the “least
democratic” of the three branches of government, it has the potential
to be the most democratic. Movement judges must be a democratizing
force.
I
THE CAPTIVE JUDICIARY
“Money speaks for money, the devil for his own . . . .”
—Billy Bragg, 198628
Our democracy is in danger. It is threatened by judges who give
unqualified protection to a few rights at the expense of many others;29
who are more concerned with protecting government prerogatives
than individual interests;30 and who are particularly apathetic to the
28 BILLY BRAGG, There Is Power in a Union, on TALKING WITH THE TAXMAN ABOUT
POETRY (Go! Discs 1986).
29 See JAMAL GREENE, HOW RIGHTS WENT WRONG: WHY OUR OBSESSION WITH
RIGHTS IS TEARING AMERICA APART, at xx (2021) (“U.S. courts recognize relatively few
rights, but strongly. They should instead recognize more rights, but weakly.”).
30 See Elie Mystal, How the Supreme Court Gave Cops a License to Kill, NATION (Apr.
8, 2021), https://www.thenation.com/article/society/chauvin-supreme-court [https://
perma.cc/A3ZS-W2RK] (discussing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), where the
Supreme Court framed Fourth Amendment violations from the viewpoint of a “reasonable
[police] officer”); Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72 B.U. L. REV. 1, 33 (1992)
(“The Court’s current approach to due process is thus avowedly pro-government. Indeed,
Erwin Chemerinsky has argued that the Constitution has been interpreted to favor the
government so consistently that the Constitution is virtually vanishing.” (citing Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 47 (1989))); James
Leonard, Ideology and Judicial Behavior: A Statistical Study of the Ohio Supreme Court:
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rights of Black and Brown individuals.31 Though the media tends to
blame former President Donald Trump and his judicial appointees for
the judiciary’s current legitimacy crisis,32 the truth is that he only exacerbated a long-running problem. The problem is that presidents from
both political parties have been taking the wrong approach to judicial
appointments for decades.33 Presidents typically appoint judges who
share their policy goals and will protect the legislation they champion
from judicial challenges. Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed judges to
sustain the New Deal.34 Ronald Reagan appointed judges to limit
(and reverse where possible) the rights-protective decisions of the
Warren Court.35 Donald Trump sought to appoint Supreme Court
Justices with the express purpose of undermining Roe v. Wade.36
These judges do what they were appointed to do: defer to the policy
objectives of the executive and legislative branches of government—
so long as those policies align with the political ends they were
appointed to serve—at the expense of the values and interests of ordinary citizens.37 But Democratic presidents have long favored suppos1970, 1975, 1980, and 1985 Terms, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 935, 957–60 (1989) (discussing the
pattern of favoring government and corporate interests over those of the individual across
different case types).
31 See Roberts, supra note 3, at 74 (“The Justices interpreted the Reconstruction
Amendments narrowly to bar white state majorities from passing explicit slave laws but
left their power to restrict [B]lack people’s freedom untouched.”).
32 See Maggie Jo Buchanan, Trump’s Politicization of the Justice System, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/courts/news/2020/02/
20/480659/trumps-politicization-justice-system [https://perma.cc/86YU-65GY] (describing
Trump’s politicization of the judiciary).
33 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Who Is Responsible for the Stealth Assault on Civil
Rights?, 114 MICH. L. REV. 893, 903, 910 (2016) (arguing that liberal Justices are equally to
blame for the Supreme Court’s rights-restrictive jurisprudence, and that the problem is
with “the type of liberal that Presidents Clinton and Obama appointed to the Supreme
Court”).
34 See Lesley Kennedy, This Is How FDR Tried to Pack the Supreme Court, HISTORY
(June 28, 2018), https://www.history.com/news/franklin-roosevelt-tried-packing-supremecourt [https://perma.cc/6FWA-QJJF] (stating that Roosevelt’s infamous “court-packing
plan” was “[l]argely seen as a political ploy to change the court for favorable rulings on
New Deal legislation” and that his later appointments amounted to packing the Court “the
old-fashioned way”).
35 See David M. O’Brien, Why Many Think that Ronald Reagan’s Court Appointments
May Have Been His Chief Legacy, HIST. NEWS NETWORK, https://www.
historynewsnetwork.org/article/10968 [https://perma.cc/DMQ9-KPTG] (explaining how
the Reagan Administration used judicial selection as a tool to achieve its policy goals).
36 See Dan Mangan, Trump: I’ll Appoint Supreme Court Justices to Overturn Roe v.
Wade Abortion Case, CNBC (Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/10/19/trump-illappoint-supreme-court-justices-to-overturn-roe-v-wade-abortion-case.html [https://
perma.cc/2L2M-C5YU] (explaining Trump’s vow to restrict abortion rights).
37 See Bagenstos, supra note 33, at 910 (explaining that the Court, including its liberal
Justices, “invoke[] the need to protect administrative discretion and policymaking against
interference by litigants and judges” to justify conservative, rights-restrictive outcomes).
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edly moderate nominees, often from the ranks of prosecutors and
BigLaw firm partners, even as Republicans have abandoned these
norms and increasingly appoint committed conservative nominees.38
The result is that many individual interests fall through the
cracks. When judges do rule in favor of individual interests, they protect a small number of rights almost absolutely and at the expense of
other rights they deem less important.39 Even where courts select a
right for robust protection, they frequently limit that right for
marginalized groups.40 They justify this overzealous protection of a
select number of rights on grounds that these rights were identified by
the Framers of the Constitution as requiring protection.41 But the
Framers were more concerned with the ability of citizens to determine
for themselves what rights were worthy of protection than with
unqualified protection of, for example, freedom of speech.42 Modern
courts have, similar to the British Parliament in the late seventeenth
and early eighteenth century, usurped the power of “We the People”
to define our country, our democracy, and our values.43 A healthy justice system requires judges who understand the interests ordinary
people have in the law and who will do what the Constitution
requires: protect individuals, their communities, and their values from
38 See Emma Green, How Democrats Lost the Courts, ATLANTIC (July 8, 2021), https://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2021/07/liberal-judges-supreme-court-breyer/619333
[https://perma.cc/2MPG-BKEH] (examining the differences between past nomination
processes under Democratic and Republican presidents).
39 See GREENE, supra note 29, at 3 (“American courts draw firm lines, often in morally
arbitrary ways, between the interests they consider rights, and those they don’t. The
interests that courts count, they protect robustly from democratic politics, while those that
they don’t count remain wholly at the government’s mercy.”).
40 See generally Radwan v. Univ. of Conn. Bd. of Trs., 465 F. Supp. 3d 75 (D. Conn.
2020) (explaining that a female collegiate athlete at a public university who lost her athletic
scholarship and was kicked off her athletic team for raising her middle finger after a game
could not recover damages); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 321 (1951) (failing to
protect the free speech rights of an individual who advocated for equal rights for Black
citizens); Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (failing to protect the First
Amendment rights of members of the Native American Church).
41 See GREENE, supra note 29, at 3.
42 See id. at 4 (“The Bill of Rights, the Constitution’s iconic collection of original rights,
is best understood less as a charter of individual liberty than as a paean to selfgovernment.”).
43 See id. at 9 (“The colonists’ demand was less for particular rights than for the right to
decide for themselves, to forge their own path to liberty through law.”); Tyler Olson,
Trump-Appointed Judges Obstruct Biden’s “Pen and Phone” Policies Just Months into
Term, FOX NEWS (June 26, 2021), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-appointedjudges-block-biden-policies.amp?__twitter_impression=true [https://perma.cc/BJJ3-R4HV]
(describing the judiciary’s significant and unusual obstruction of the prerogatives of the
executive branch); TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2225 (2021) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (describing the Court’s use of the standing doctrine as “a tool of judicial
aggrandizement”).
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hostile executive actors and legislators.44 Instead, our justice system is
currently captive to both the inherently conservative inertia of its
precedents and the fruits of a decades-long reactionary project to pack
the bench with ideologues.
A. The Supreme Court’s Anti-Democracy Precedents
Supreme Court precedent has been historically rights-restrictive
and anti-Black. This is true across diverse areas of the law. Professor
Dorothy Roberts has attributed what she calls the Court’s “antiabolitionist” jurisprudence to three doctrines: “colorblindness, the discriminatory purpose requirement, and fear of too much justice.”45
Wrapped up in these three doctrines is a disregard for individual interests in the outcome of a case and a disregard for the effect the Court’s
decision will have on individuals, especially on Black and Brown
people.46 Rather than engage with the effect laws have in perpetuating
oppressive institutions founded on white supremacy, the Court “typically strikes down race-conscious affirmative action measures as
racially biased while upholding ostensibly race-neutral . . . practices
that repress communities of color.”47
The Court’s voting rights jurisprudence provides a clear example.
Despite frequent proclamations of the importance of the right to vote
in maintaining a healthy democracy, the Court has repeatedly
impaired the ability of individuals to participate in the political process. In its voting rights jurisprudence, the Court has constructed
almost insurmountable procedural and evidentiary hurdles to limit the
scope of the Voting Rights Act48 and Fifteenth Amendment.49 This
effectively bars suits attempting to actualize the promise of equal
voting rights for minority voters. At the same time, by requiring raceconscious legislation aimed at remedying past discrimination to withstand strict scrutiny, the Court limits the ability of state legislatures to
44 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 236 (Alexander Hamilton) (Michael A. Genovese
ed., 2009) (explaining that it is the duty of the judiciary to strike down legislative acts
“contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution” and that “all the reservations of
particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing” if the judiciary does not exercise
this power). The need to apply this principle is particularly acute when law is applied to
marginalized communities.
45 Roberts, supra note 3, at 76.
46 See id. at 77–93 (describing these three doctrines).
47 Id. at 87.
48 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a)–(b).
49 See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62, 74 (1980) (“[R]acially
discriminatory motivation is a necessary ingredient of a Fifteenth Amendment
violation. . . . The ultimate question remains whether a discriminatory intent has been
proved in a given case. More distant instances of official discrimination in other cases are
of limited help in resolving that question.”).
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act affirmatively to ensure minority votes are not diluted.50 The Court
has justified its application of strict scrutiny in this context, which
serves to constitutionalize efforts to dilute minority voting strength, by
relying on “our country’s long and persistent history of racial discrimination in voting.”51 The irony of this application of history has not
been lost on scholars.52 Further, the analysis overlooks the impact
voting legislation has on the ability of citizens to participate in democracy, focusing instead on the state’s interest in enacting the legislation.53 The result is that, despite two constitutional amendments and
the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, voting rights of minority
voters remain under siege by state legislatures that remain free to pass
restrictive voting legislation without meaningful judicial oversight.54
Movement judges, by contrast, would develop a standard focusing
scrutiny in the other direction: Remedial legislation could be justified
by the government’s legitimate interest in promoting participatory
50 See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 645 (1993) (“[D]istrict lines obviously drawn for the
purpose of separating voters by race require careful scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause regardless of the motivations underlying their adoption.”).
51 Id. at 650.
52 See James U. Blacksher, American Political Identity and History, 95 NW. U. L. REV.
715, 719 (2001) (reviewing ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED
HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES (2000)) (noting the “novel use” to which
the Court “put America’s history of racial discrimination and of the constitutional law
developed to combat discrimination” in Shaw).
53 See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 202–03 (2008)
(downplaying the law’s burden on the right to vote while overstating the legitimate state
interests at stake); Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 580 (2013) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“The Court makes no genuine attempt to engage with the massive legislative
record that Congress assembled. Instead, it relies on increases in voter registration and
turnout as if that were the whole story.”).
54 Two common examples of tools used to disenfranchise voters are voter ID laws, see,
e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-417 (West 2021); IND. CODE § 3-5-2-40.5 (West 2021); MO.
ANN. STAT. § 115.427 (West 2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-7-112 (West 2021); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 6.79 (West 2021), and restrictions on early voting, see, e.g., Matt Dixon, Gov. Rick
Scott Signs Election Bill that Cuts Early-Voting Days, FLA. TIMES-UNION (May 19, 2011),
https://www.jacksonville.com/story/news/politics/2011/05/19/gov-rick-scott-signs-electionbill-cuts-early-voting-days/15903217007 [https://perma.cc/N2YQ-SAB6] (reducing earlyvoting days from fifteen to eight); Alexandra Olgin, Early Voting Changes in North
Carolina Spark Bipartisan Controversy, NPR (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/10/
17/657928248/early-voting-changes-in-north-carolina-spark-bipartisan-controversy [https://
perma.cc/7S42-WA5C] (discussing a new state law that resulted “in nearly 20 percent fewer
places to cast votes before Election Day”). At least one scholar has also argued that
campaign finance laws systematically “exclude communities of color from the political
process.” John Powell, Campaign Finance Reform Is a Voting Rights Issue: The Campaign
Finance System as the Latest Incarnation of the Politics of Exclusion, 5 AFR.-AM. L. &
POL’Y REP. 1, 2 (2002); see also Theodore R. Johnson & Max Feldman, The New Voter
Suppression, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/ourwork/research-reports/new-voter-suppression [https://perma.cc/5QEX-WQZU] (discussing
various election procedures that result in disenfranchisement of certain groups of voters).
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democracy, while restrictions on voting rights that effectively disenfranchise minority voters would be subjected to strict scrutiny.
In Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee,55 the Court
doubled down on its efforts to impair the ability of voters to vindicate
their right to vote. Mere hours after the opinion was handed down, it
was severely criticized for its unrealistic portrayal of the burdens of
voting in Arizona and its tortured reading of section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act.56 At the outset, Justice Alito’s majority opinion contended, despite clear evidence of the burden imposed on minority
voters by the challenged regulations, that Arizona law “generally
makes it quite easy for residents to vote.”57 The Court went on to hold
that states may limit the ways in which voters can cast their ballots so
long as some avenues to voting remain open.58 This reasoning is reminiscent of Fourth Amendment cases in which the Court has frequently
refused to apply the exclusionary rule, contending that plaintiffs can
seek civil damages against the law enforcement officer notwithstanding the fact that such suits are often barred by qualified
immunity.59
Likewise in Brnovich, Justice Alito concluded that all voters still
had the option to vote in person or by mail for almost a month before
the election, despite the fact that some voters, particularly minority
voters, lived far away from polling places and post offices, making
these options unfeasible in practice even though they were available
in theory.60
Brnovich established a multi-factor test to determine whether
section 2 plaintiffs have shown “denial or abridgement” of the right to
55

141 S. Ct. 2321 (2021).
See, e.g., Mark Joseph Stern, The Supreme Court Just Mangled the Voting Rights Act
Beyond Recognition, SLATE (July 1, 2021), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021/07/
brnovich-voting-rights-act-alito.html [https://perma.cc/4W8X-PXH3].
57 Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2333; see id. at 2366–67 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (describing
evidence of how Arizona’s voting policies disproportionately affect minority voters).
58 See id. at 2344 (characterizing Arizona’s out-of-precinct rule and ballot-collection
law as “unremarkable burdens” that do not violate the Voting Rights Act because there
are “other easy ways to vote”).
59 See Lange v. California, 141 S. Ct. 2011, 2027–28 (2021) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(stating that criminal defendants may not rely on the exclusionary rule “when it would
encourage bad conduct by criminal defendants” and that defendants must instead “rely on
other remedies” but failing to note that these other remedies are largely foreclosed);
Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of the Causes,
104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 1522 (2016) (“[T]he qualified immunity regime erects a significant
doctrinal hurdle to holding police officers accountable for acts of violence.”).
60 141 S. Ct. at 2330 (“All voters may vote by mail or in person for nearly a month
before election day . . . .”); id. at 2370 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting the difficulty for some
voters, especially “Native Americans in rural Arizona,” of accessing post offices to mail
their ballots).
56
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vote. This test, purporting to reflect the “totality of the circumstances,” includes several factors that are in no way relevant to
whether the plaintiffs had the ability to vote, such as the state’s
alleged interest in the election regulation at issue.61 Simultaneously,
the majority opinion “decried the dissent’s discussion of several factors that, according to Justice Alito, ‘have little bearing on the question’ before the Court, such as the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in
Shelby County v. Holder, ‘voting rules that are not at issue,’ and
‘points of law that nobody disputes.’”62 In its decision in Brnovich,
the Supreme Court severely hobbled the ability of the people to participate in their democracy.63 This impairment of rights, coupled with
the fact that the Court repeatedly interferes to counteract
majoritarian impulses while failing to check government abuses of
power, indicates that the present judiciary poses a severe threat to our
democracy. Movement judges in such cases would enforce the Voting
Rights Act in accord with its text and historically evident purpose to
protect minority voting rights against state government abuses.
In housing discrimination cases, the Court has made it similarly
impracticable for plaintiffs to carry their burden of proof, while simultaneously making it easy for the state to justify discriminatory conduct. In Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v.
Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.,64 the Court held that plaintiffs
can bring disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act
(FHA),65 but it immediately imposed a heavy burden on such plaintiffs. A plaintiff seeking relief on a disparate impact claim must be
able to point to a policy the defendant follows that caused the disparity—a defendant’s “one-time decision [causing a disparate impact]
may not be a policy at all.”66 Even if the plaintiff is able to point to a
policy causing the disparate impact, the plaintiff will only succeed if
61

See id. at 2338–40 (majority opinion).
Elena Schiefele, Note, When Statutory Interpretation Becomes Precedent: Why
Individual Rights Advocates Shouldn’t Be So Quick to Praise Bostock, 78 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1105, 1142 n.253 (2021) (citation omitted) (quoting Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2341).
63 Brnovich dealt a significant blow to the continuing vitality of the VRA, but two
Justices might have gone even further to gut section 2. In a short, one-paragraph
concurrence, Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Thomas, stated that section 2 may not even
“furnish[] an implied cause of action,” but nonetheless joined the Court’s opinion in full
because “no party argues that the plaintiffs lack a cause of action here.” Brnovich, 141 S.
Ct. at 2350 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
64 576 U.S. 519 (2015).
65 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619, 3631.
66 Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 576 U.S. at 543 (“A plaintiff who fails to allege facts at the
pleading stage or produce statistical evidence demonstrating a causal connection cannot
make out a prima facie case of disparate impact.”).
62
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the challenged policy is “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary.”67 If the
Government can point to a reasonable state interest that the decision
or policy serves, even though that interest is clearly pretextual, it can
usually cleanse otherwise discriminatory conduct.68 In this way, like in
its voting rights jurisprudence, the Court has insulated government
decisionmaking rather than protecting societal interests and ensuring
government accountability to the people. Movement judges, faced
with such fact patterns, would be able to treat pretextual reasoning as
unworthy of deference, instead examining the actual motivations for
discriminatory policies.
B. The Judiciary’s Anti-Democracy Problem Is Pervasive
The problem is not limited to the Supreme Court. Federal judges
in Wisconsin and Florida struck down the Biden Administration’s
efforts to remedy a history of racial and ethnic discrimination against
farmers and ranchers.69 The program, part of the American Rescue
Plan Act of 2021, was intended to address the USDA’s “past and present discrimination” and “assur[e] that public dollars drawn from the
tax contributions of all citizens do not serve to finance the evil of private prejudice.”70 The Wisconsin court determined that “the program
grants privileges to individuals based solely on their race,” and thus
applied strict scrutiny.71 In so doing, it focused on the government’s
interests and the harm to the white plaintiffs.72 It completely ignored
the plight of the farmers of color, struggling against the lasting effects
of over a century of discrimination. The decision simply cast aside the
67

Id. at 540 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
For example, in Ellis v. City of Minneapolis, 860 F.3d 1106, 1113 (8th Cir. 2017), the
Eighth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that they were victims of excessive and
discriminatory code inspections on grounds of a “widespread and severe” rodent problem
of which there was little to no evidence.
69 See Faust v. Vilsack, 519 F. Supp. 3d 470, 476 (E.D. Wis. 2021) (“Defendants’ use of
race-based criteria in the administration of the program violates [Plaintiffs’] right to equal
protection under the law.”); Laura Reiley, Federal Judge Halts Black Farmers’ Debt-Relief
Program in New Legal Blow, WASH. POST (June 23, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/business/2021/06/23/black-farmers-debt-relief-preliminary-injunction [https://
perma.cc/9KRB-B6FU] (describing a Florida federal court’s injunction blocking—as
discriminatory—a measure meant to redress the inequitable distribution of previous
coronavirus debt relief to farmers by earmarking some federal aid for Black farmers).
70 Faust, 519 F. Supp. 3d at 475.
71 Id. For another example of a court applying strict scrutiny to a program meant to
increase opportunities for Black people and striking down the program because of an
insufficient record of past discrimination, see Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 154 (4th
Cir. 1994) (“[M]ere knowledge of historical fact is not the kind of present effect that can
justify a race-exclusive remedy.”).
72 See Faust, 519 F. Supp. 3d at 475–78 (considering the relative harm and interest of
the Government and plaintiffs but not of those individuals whom the program was
designed to benefit).
68
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societal values reflected in the policy decisions of a democratically
elected president—values that mirrored increased support for racial
justice initiatives expressed in the Black Lives Matter movement.73 A
movement judge, examining the same statute, could instead see its
clear remedial purpose and the underlying legacy of racial discrimination that Congress sought to address, and uphold the statute’s
constitutionality.
Nor is the problem confined to problems of racial justice or areas
of law commonly understood to cause racial disparities. The Supreme
Court recently decided Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid.74 In Hassid,
the Supreme Court struck down a California regulation granting labor
organizations a right to access agricultural employers’ property.75 The
majority’s opinion is reminiscent of the Court’s infamous decision in
Lochner v. New York,76 in that it is based on value judgments about
what regulations are desirable rather than on reasoned, impartial constitutional analysis.77 Its reasoning threatens anti-discrimination laws,
fair housing laws, endangered species protection laws, and all manner
of other laws regulating businesses and property use.78 Ad hoc exceptions discussed in the opinion are based on nothing more than policy
preferences.79 This decision, in the midst of continuing popular support for the pro-labor movement,80 is distinctly counter73 See Gary Langer, 63% Support Black Lives Matter as Recognition of Discrimination
Jumps: Poll, ABC NEWS (July 21, 2020), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/63-support-blacklives-matter-recognition-discrimination-jumps/story?id=71779435 [https://perma.cc/HHZ5U46H] (“Sixty-three percent of Americans support the Black Lives Matter movement and
a record 69%—the most by far in 32 years of polling—say Black people and other
minorities are denied equal treatment in the criminal justice system . . . .”).
74 141 S. Ct. 2063 (2021).
75 Id. at 2074.
76 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
77 See Ian Millhiser, The Supreme Court Just Handed Down Disastrous News for
Unions, VOX (June 23, 2021), https://www.vox.com/2021/6/23/22547182/supreme-courtunion-busting-cedar-point-hassid-john-roberts-takings-clause [https://perma.cc/495RYVP5] (comparing Hassid to Lochner); GREENE, supra note 29, at xxiv (“[T]he Lochner
era wasn’t just about the overprotection of the right to contract. Courts during this period
were equally conspicuous in their indifference to basic civil rights and civil liberties.”).
78 See Niko Bowie (@nikobowie), TWITTER (June 23, 2021, 11:30 AM), https://
mobile.twitter.com/nikobowie/status/1407722797653233668 [https://perma.cc/R86R-N7P7]
(criticizing the implications of the Court’s opinion in Hassid).
79 See Hassid, 141 S. Ct. at 2077 (professing an exception for businesses “generally
open to the public”); Bowie, supra note 78 (discussing the exception).
80 See Megan Brenan, At 65%, Approval of Labor Unions in U.S. Remains High,
GALLUP (Sept. 3, 2020), https://news.gallup.com/poll/318980/approval-labor-unionsremains-high.aspx [https://perma.cc/63NJ-JBZH] (“Americans’ 65% approval of labor
unions is once again the highest it has been since 2003. Public support for labor unions has
been generally rising since hitting its lowest point of 48% in 2009, during the Great
Recession.”).
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majoritarian.81 Movement judges, examining the relevant statutes and
property interests, could apply well-established constitutional principles to analyze the intrusion upon property rights along the lines of a
regulatory taking or exaction which was ultimately justified by the
state’s police power. Here, too, the problem is not with the Supreme
Court or Republican appointees alone. A study recently found that
“there is a statistically significant relationship between a judge’s corporate background or prosecutorial experience and whether he/she
votes in favor of the claimant in employment cases.”82 These judges
currently represent seventy percent of active federal circuit judges and
a similar fraction of federal district judges.83 Consequently, judicial
outcomes in employment cases cannot reflect societal values.
In a different case, a federal judge blocked the Biden
Administration’s suspension of new oil and gas leases.84 The suspension was part of the Administration’s broader efforts to address climate change.85 Without acknowledging the immediacy of the climate
crisis, the judge determined that the Administration had failed to provide “any rational explanation in cancelling the lease sales, and in
enacting the Pause.”86 He cynically alluded to the loss of revenue that
pays for efforts to restore coastal wetlands, but ignored the continuing
detrimental effects of climate change on coastal wetlands around the
world.87 Environmental conservation is also an issue with broad pop81 See Aı́da Chávez, Will Democratic Court Nominations Live Up to Biden’s Promises?,
NATION (June 16, 2021), https://www.thenation.com/article/politics/democrat-courtappointments [https://perma.cc/LP35-X6RZ] (noting President Biden’s promise to be the
“most pro-union president in history”).
82 JOANNA SHEPHERD, JOBS, JUDGES, AND JUSTICE: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
PROFESSIONAL DIVERSITY AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS 15 (2021), https://demandjustice.org/
wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Jobs-Judges-and-Justice-Shepherd-3-08-21.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2AEN-VF3Z].
83 See id. at 2–4 (noting the high percentage of federal circuit judges with prior
experience in private practice or as a federal prosecutor); Carrie Johnson, Corporate
Lawyers Who Become Judges Less Likely to Side with Workers, Study Says, NPR (Feb. 24,
2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/02/24/970538084/how-judges-work-experience-can-impactcourt-rulings-and-legal-precedent [https://perma.cc/8KFH-4UVV] (“Former prosecutors
and corporate lawyers make up nearly 7 in 10 judges on the federal district courts . . . .”).
84 See generally Louisiana v. Biden, No. 21-CV-00778, 2021 WL 2446010 (W.D. La.
June 15, 2021) (holding that the suspension of oil and gas leases exceeded the
Administration’s authority on several grounds).
85 See Kevin McGill, Federal Judge Blocks Biden’s Pause on New Oil, Gas Leases,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 16, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-climate-changeenvironment-and-nature-business-9751c4909a8b1baba28f3bcff9d5fa6e [https://perma.cc/
5QZQ-EE44] (describing the decision as a “blow to . . . Biden’s efforts to rapidly transition
the nation away from fossil fuels and thereby stave off the worst effects of climate
change”).
86 Biden, 2021 WL 2446010, at *18.
87 See id. at *22 (“Local government funding, jobs for Plaintiff State workers, and funds
for the restoration of Louisiana’s Coastline are at stake.”).
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ular support, and this case further demonstrates the judiciary’s apathy
toward the values of ordinary people.88 A movement judge easily
could have considered the urgency of climate change and found a
rational basis for the executive action.
Federal abortion cases also demonstrate this apathy. Despite the
fact that seventy-five percent of Americans view the Supreme Court’s
1973 decision in Roe v. Wade 89 favorably,90 circuit judges have repeatedly called for the Supreme Court to reexamine and overrule Roe and
the Court’s subsequent decision in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.91 On May 17, 2021, the Supreme
Court finally heeded their calls when it granted the petition for a writ
of certiorari in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization.92 At
the time of this writing, the Court has not yet reached a decision in the
case, but pro-choice advocates have expressed serious concerns that
the Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbs will likely mark the end of the
Roe era.93 Their concerns were validated when Mississippi’s Attorney
General filed a brief on behalf of the parties defending Mississippi’s
88 See Cary Funk & Brian Kennedy, How Americans See Climate Change and the
Environment in 7 Charts, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/
fact-tank/2020/04/21/how-americans-see-climate-change-and-the-environment-in-7-charts
[https://perma.cc/SFQ5-9TY6] (explaining that nearly two-thirds of Americans believe that
“protecting the environment should be a top priority for the president and Congress”).
89 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
90 Domenico Montanaro, Poll: Majority Want to Keep Abortion Legal, But They Also
Want Restrictions, NPR (June 7, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/06/07/730183531/pollmajority-want-to-keep-abortion-legal-but-they-also-want-restrictions [https://perma.cc/
SA2J-TAKJ].
91 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Dobbs, 945 F.3d 265, 286
(5th Cir. 2019) (Ho, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[F]ederal courts, without any basis in
the constitutional text or original meaning, restrict the ability of states to regulate in the
area of abortion. But that is of course what decades of Supreme Court precedent
mandates. Accordingly, I am required to affirm.”); Little Rock Fam. Plan. Servs. v.
Rutledge, 984 F.3d 682, 692 (8th Cir. 2021) (Shepherd, J., concurring) (“Because the
Court’s opinion applies binding Supreme Court precedent, I join it in full. I write
separately, however, to reiterate my view that ‘good reasons exist for the [Supreme] Court
to reevaluate its jurisprudence’ regarding the viability standard as announced in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.” (alteration in original) (quoting MKB
Mgmt. Corp. v. Stenehjem, 795 F.3d 768, 773 (8th Cir. 2015))). State legislatures are
continuing to restrict abortion rights, despite popular support. See Elizabeth Nash &
Sophia Naide, State Policy Trends at Midyear 2021: Already the Worst Legislative Year
Ever for U.S. Abortion Rights, GUTTMACHER INST. (July 1, 2021), https://
www.guttmacher.org/article/2021/07/state-policy-trends-midyear-2021-already-worstlegislative-year-ever-us-abortion [https://perma.cc/P5NN-8YYX] (“More abortion
restrictions—90—have already been enacted in 2021 than in any year since the Roe v.
Wade decision was handed down in 1973.”).
92 141 S. Ct. 2619 (May 17, 2021) (mem.) (order granting the writ of certiorari).
93 See Nina Totenberg, In Challenge to Roe, Supreme Court to Review Mississippi
Abortion Law, NPR (May 17, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/05/17/997478374/supremecourt-to-review-mississippi-abortion-ban [https://perma.cc/H37N-7N9X].
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restrictive abortion law expressly urging the Court to overrule Roe.94
Rather than continuing to justify further intrusions into the privacy
reasoning of Roe, movement judges could apply abolition constitutionalism to uphold reproductive rights under a Thirteenth
Amendment rationale.
State courts have also handed down their share of rightsrestrictive decisions.95 These decisions receive less media attention
because they are more local in nature and do not often present the
same immediately apparent and far-reaching dire consequences as do
federal court decisions. It is easy to focus on the federal judiciary, but
the fact is that ninety-five percent of all cases in the United States are
filed in state courts.96 State judges are just as important as federal
judges in preserving individual rights and protecting societal values, if
not more so.
As the examples in this Section attempt to demonstrate, the rot in
our system is pervasive. Examples of counter-majoritarian and antidemocratic judicial decisionmaking abound. Hiding behind judicial
restraint, courts increasingly strike down or significantly narrow democratically enacted legislation, often dealing painful blows to individual rights.97 At the same time, they limit the scope of constitutional
rights and the availability of remedies for those rights. These decisions
all share a common trait—like the infamous Dred Scott decision,98
they are clothed in terms of the mainstream constitutional discourse
of their time.99 Their consequences are not apparent to the untrained
eye. Even when they are not in the majority, movement judges serve
94 See Brief for Petitioners at 14, Dobbs, No. 19-1392 (July 22, 2021) (“This Court
should overrule Roe and Casey. . . . Roe and Casey are egregiously wrong. . . . And nothing
but a full break from those cases can stem the harms they have caused.”).
95 See Jess Bravin, Breaking with Tradition, Some Judges Speak Out on Racial
Injustices, WALL ST. J. (June 13, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/breaking-withtradition-some-judges-speak-out-on-racial-injustices-11592060400 [https://perma.cc/6UYCXV5Y] (describing “statements” by state supreme courts on “the judiciary’s role in
perpetuating injustices and pledging to root out racial bias”).
96 Top Court Filing Statistics from Around the Country, ONE LEGAL (Apr. 3, 2019),
https://www.onelegal.com/blog/top-court-filing-statistics-from-around-the-country [https://
perma.cc/26KN-PDEY].
97 For a comprehensive and insightful discussion of the danger the Supreme Court’s
statutory interpretation jurisprudence poses to individual rights, see generally Schiefele,
supra note 62.
98 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
99 See Jeannie Suk Gersen, The Importance of Teaching Dred Scott, NEW YORKER
(June 8, 2021), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-importance-ofteaching-dred-scott [https://perma.cc/CSK2-N8UC] (stating that Dred Scott and other nowreviled Supreme Court decisions “are not necessarily poorly reasoned according to the
forms of constitutional analysis that we still use today, involving the interpretation of text,
structure, and history”).
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the vital function of alerting their colleagues, future courts, and the
public to the consequences these decisions will have.100 We need
movement judges at every level—state and federal, trial and appellate—to protect our democracy.
Right now, the judiciary is filled with former prosecutors, corporate attorneys, and academics who are completely detached from the
communities whose rights they are supposed to protect.101 Judges like
Thurgood Marshall and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who engaged with the
social movements of their time and understood the realities of the
struggle against institutional oppression, are largely absent from the
bench.102 As Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote:
Although all of us come to the Court with our own personal histories and experiences, Justice Marshall brought a special perspective.
His was the eye of a lawyer who saw the deepest wounds in the
social fabric and used law to heal them. His was the ear of a counselor who understood the vulnerabilities of the accused and established safeguards for their protection.103

Today, this perspective is sorely lacking on the bench. For instance,
few current Supreme Court Justices have ever represented individuals
against the government to vindicate their constitutional rights.104 That
is not to say that one cannot become a movement judge after being
appointed to the federal bench. Justice Sonia Sotomayor, Fourth
Circuit Chief Judge Roger Gregory, and Southern District of
Mississippi Judge Carlton Reeves, whose jurisprudence is discussed in
Part III of this Article, all demonstrate that this is possible. But these
judges have one thing in common: They are people of color who grew
100 See Greenhouse, supra note 16 (stating that Justice Sotomayor’s separate opinions
“enlarge[] the frame within which the debate over the precise legal issues play[s] out”).
101 See Clark Neily, Are a Disproportionate Number of Federal Judges Former
Government Advocates?, CATO INST. (May 27, 2021), https://www.cato.org/study/aredisproportionate-number-federal-judges-former-government-advocates [https://perma.cc/
F5U8-5SNK] (“[I]t is generally perceived that a disproportionate number of federal judges
served as government lawyers before donning a robe.”).
102 Though Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s career prior to her appointment to the federal
bench differs from Justices Marshall and Ginsburg, I consider her to be a movement judge.
Her opinions demonstrate an understanding of the consequences of the Court’s decisions
for everyday Americans, and she is not afraid to call out her colleagues for failing to give
these consequences proper consideration. See Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 74–75
(2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (examining the “human consequences—including those
for communities”—of the majority’s decision).
103 SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW: REFLECTIONS OF A SUPREME
COURT JUSTICE 133 (Craig Joyce ed., 2003).
104 But see Richard A. Serrano, Roberts Donated Help to Gay Rights Case, L.A. TIMES
(Aug. 4, 2005), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2005-aug-04-na-roberts4story.html [https://perma.cc/2EJ9-838G] (“In U.S. vs. Halper, Roberts’ first appearance
before the high court, he argued that adding a civil penalty to a criminal one was double
jeopardy and therefore unconstitutional.”).
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up in marginalized communities.105 Thus, even though they did not
engage with social movements in their careers prior to their judicial
appointment, they nonetheless carried the perspective of the people
to the bench because of their own lived experiences. By appointing
more movement judges, judges who understand contemporary societal values and the consequences their decisions have in the real
world, we can reverse the current trend of rights-restrictive jurisprudence.106 This is the only way we can save our democracy.
II
MOVEMENT LAW, MOVEMENT LAWYERING,
DEMANDS

AND

THEIR

“I wish I could say that racism and prejudice were only distant memories. . . . We must dissent from the indifference. We must dissent from
the apathy. We must dissent from the fear, the hatred and the mistrust. . . . We must dissent, because America can do better, because
America has no choice but to do better.”
—Justice Thurgood Marshall, 1992107
105 Specifically, Judges Reeves and Chief Judge Gregory are Black, and Justice
Sotomayor is Puerto Rican, and both Chief Judge Gregory and Justice Sotomayor were the
first individuals from their backgrounds to achieve appointment to their respective
courts—a distinction indicative of the marginalization their communities historically face.
See Ariane de Vogue, Meet the Judge Who Took on Donald Trump, CNN (Apr. 17, 2019),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/17/politics/judge-carlton-reeves-donald-trump/index.html
[https://perma.cc/PLZ2-YMUF] (“[Judge Reeves] is the second African-American to be
appointed as a federal judge in Mississippi and has spoken about the hate mail he has
received since becoming a judge.”); The Hon. Roger L. Gregory, AM. L. INST., https://
www.ali.org/members/member/439578 [https://perma.cc/78FX-6MTX] (“He is the first
African-American to sit on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
. . . .”); Sonia Sotomayor, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/justices/sonia_sotomayor [https://
perma.cc/44NM-E7PQ] (“Sotomayor was born in the Bronx on June 25, 1954 to Juan
Sotomayor and Celina Baez, both native Puerto Ricans.”). Judge Reeves grew up in a
segregated community in Mississippi. See Kenya Downs, The Man Behind the Speech:
Judge Carlton Reeves Takes on Mississippi’s Past, NPR (Mar. 2, 2015), https://
www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2015/03/02/387477815/the-man-behind-the-speech-judgecarlton-reeves-takes-on-mississippis-past [https://perma.cc/TS6Z-KZBG] (“It’s a
Mississippi that Reeves knows all too well, having grown up in the rural Yazoo City, 40
miles north of Jackson, where ‘everybody knew their place,’ he said in an interview. ‘It was
divided by railroad tracks, and you knew where you could and could not go.’”).
106 See Comrade Thomas, STRICT SCRUTINY, at 19:17 (June 25, 2021), https://
strictscrutinypodcast.com/podcast/comrade-thomas [https://perma.cc/KK7E-946N]
(describing the Court’s decision in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021), as
“a real failure to empathize with people who might be in a different financial situation or
socioeconomic status as [the members of the Court]”).
107 THURGOOD MARSHALL, Acceptance Speech After Receiving the Liberty Award: We
Must Dissent (July 4, 1992), in SUPREME JUSTICE: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 311, 313–14 (J.
Clay Smith, Jr. ed., 2003).
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The judiciary’s captivity blinds our law to the needs of its people.
Turning to the teachings of movement law can remedy this.108 Distinct
from movement lawyering,109 movement law “approaches scholarly
thinking and writing about law, justice, and social change as work
done in solidarity with social movements, local organizing, and other
forms of collective struggle. As it begins in solidarity and with commitments to justice and freedom, it often begins outside of the law as
traditionally conceived.”110 Instead of regurgitating ivory tower concepts of the law, movement law acknowledges “We the People.” It
links arms with grassroots resistance and idealism. It champions a law
of many faces—beyond the milky white visage of the Framers.111
Various social movements inform movement law’s development.
By studying and emulating how movements build and shift power
beyond courts and the Constitution, movement law may use complementary strategies to change our courts and the Constitution.112 The
values and goals of these social movements cannot be approached
individually but instead must be considered in relation to each
other.113 Similarly, movement law is inclusive and intersects multiple
108

See Akbar et al., supra note 19, at 825–26.
See Scott L. Cummings, Movement Lawyering, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1645, 1690
(2017) (“[M]ovement lawyering is the mobilization of law through deliberately planned
and interconnected advocacy strategies, inside and outside of formal law-making spaces, by
lawyers who are accountable to politically marginalized constituencies to build the power
of those constituencies to produce and sustain democratic social change goals that they
define.” (emphasis omitted)).
110 Akbar et al., supra note 19, at 826; see id. at 847–48 (“[Movement law’s] necessity
[falls] within . . . the increasingly clear failures of neoliberal law and politics and the surge
of social movement activity and grassroots organizing. . . . [W]hen the right and left are [in]
a crisis of legitimacy of the status quo, scholars of law can play an important role.”).
111 See id. at 856 (“[O]rganizers are keenly aware that the lives of workers—as women,
people of color, differently abled, and queer and trans—are intersectional and that
understanding their intersectional identities grounds organizing strategies.”).
112 See id. at 852 (“Movement law requires studying how movements build and shift
power—beyond courts and the Constitution—and prefigure the economic, social, and
political relationships of the world they are working to build.”).
113 See id. at 839 (“Using intersectionality, legal scholars might attend to overlapping
forms of oppression and ‘map[] the margins,’ looking, for example, to how courts render
invisible the experiences of Black women, or to how antiracist and feminist struggles fail to
attend to the multiple marginalization of women of color.” (alteration in original)
(footnotes omitted)); About, BLACK LIVES MATTER, https://blacklivesmatter.com/about
[https://perma.cc/YTL2-WKQY] (“We affirm the lives of Black queer and trans folks,
disabled folks, undocumented folks, folks with records, women, and all Black lives along
the gender spectrum. Our network centers those who have been marginalized within Black
liberation movements.”). See generally Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the
Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine,
Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 145 (1989) (analyzing
how separate racial and gender subordination theories could not fully address
discrimination against Black women); Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV.
109
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movements. As movement law transforms to accommodate new
waves of thought, it seeks to become greater than its parts.114
Grassroots movements must be distinguished from their topdown imitators, though.115 The strategy of imitation movements goes
beyond vaguely-named groups116 acting as fronts for business; monied
interests go so far as to construct vast networks to astroturf an entire
movement.117 Even when aristocrats successfully recruit foot soldiers
for their class warfare campaigns, their organizations and strategies
remain distinct from those of liberationist movements. For example,
the Federalist Society may claim a large number of members—60,000,
according to its website118—but it simply is not a grassroots organization; it continues to take corporate funding, and was initially financed
by the Olin Foundation.119 Even the anti-abortion movement sprang
from a top-down structure: Paul Weyrich and Jerry Falwell only
pushed its adoption by evangelical churches when they realized that
segregation in private schools—while quite motivating to church
1241, 1243–44 (1991) (exploring the intersectional relationship between discrimination on
the basis of race and gender).
114 While legal academia produces some interpretive movements of its own (i.e., law and
economics or originalism), movement law is not about the study of such schools of thought.
115 See Edward T. Walker, What’s the Difference Between Political Grassroots and BigInterest Astroturf?, UCLA NEWSROOM (July 8, 2014), https://newsroom.ucla.edu/stories/
whats-the-difference-between-political-grassroots-and-big-interest-astroturf [https://
perma.cc/4AX5-4GBR] (discussing the strategies and methods of corporate-funded
campaigns designed to mimic grassroots movements).
116 See id. (predicting the attempts of telecommunications companies to use
organizations named “Broadband for America” and “American Consumer Institute” to
influence the debate over net neutrality).
117 See Eric Zuesse, Final Proof the Tea Party Was Founded as a Bogus AstroTurf
Movement, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 6, 2017, 9:54 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/
final-proof-the-tea-party_b_4136722 [https://perma.cc/TW3L-CLL2] (documenting the
years-long project backed by the Koch brothers aimed at curbing government spending on
social programs that resulted in the apparently sudden emergence of the Tea Party).
118 See About Us, FEDERALIST SOCIETY, https://fedsoc.org/about-us [https://perma.cc/
566R-486X].
119 See id. (claiming that the Society receives funding from foundations and
corporations); Dylan Matthews & Byrd Pinkerton, The Incredible Influence of the
Federalist Society, Explained, VOX (June 3, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/futureperfect/2019/6/3/18632438/federalist-society-leonard-leo-brett-kavanaugh [https://perma.cc/
VXD5-ENH6] (discussing the Olin Foundation’s early funding of the Federalist Society as
part of a network of anti-democratic, tax-exempt money). The Olin Foundation’s money
derives from munitions and chemical manufacturing. See Lizzy Ratner, Olin Foundation,
Right-Wing Tank, Snuffing Itself, OBSERVER (May 9, 2005, 12:00 AM), https://
observer.com/2005/05/olin-foundation-rightwing-tank-snuffing-itself [https://perma.cc/
626V-9PXY] (“Its benefactor, John Merrill Olin, was a wealthy Midwestern industrialist
and heir to an ammunition company that merged with a chemical corporation in the mid1950’s.”).
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leaders—would not drive parishioners to the polls.120 The power
dynamics of anti-democratic pressure campaigns necessarily separate
them from the liberationist movements of marginalized and oppressed
people.
To reach an understanding of the law informed by relevant social
movements, scholars must pay close attention to these social movements and everyday people.121 Scholars Amna A. Akbar, Sameer M.
Ashar, and Jocelyn Simonson recently summarized the interrelated
moves required to progress towards movement law:
First, movement law scholars pay close attention to modes of resistance by social movements and everyday people. . . . Second, movement law scholars work to understand the strategies, tactics, and
experiments of resistance and contestation. . . . Third, movement
law scholars take seriously the epistemologies and histories of the
social movements they study. Fourth, movement law scholars move
with a sense of solidarity and accountability to the social movements they study.122

Movement judges must be receptive to the arguments of movement
lawyering and conscious of the explorations of movement law.
Where movement law attempts to carve out a space within legal
scholarship to think alongside social movements, movement lawyering
works alongside those movements in legal practice.123 Movement lawyering seeks to advance social justice by aligning—and at times subordinating—legal practice to grassroots social movements.124 While
movement lawyering often operates within existing legal principles, it
must also recognize the need to develop alternative legal structures.125
The conception of such alternative structures is fertile ground for the
interaction of movement law and movement lawyering—a process
which legislatures and movement judges would do well to heed. In the
120 See Randall Balmer, The Real Origins of the Religious Right, POLITICO (May 27,
2014), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/05/religious-right-real-origins-107133
[https://www.perma.cc/79YQ-2SW2] (documenting the deliberate efforts of Weyrich and
Falwell to sell abortion as a political issue that evangelicals would use as a litmus test
following the political awakening of their ministers over segregation).
121 See Akbar et al., supra note 19, at 848 (“[M]ovement law scholars pay close attention
to organizing, social movements, and collective resistance by everyday people.”).
122 Id.
123 Id. at 826 (distinguishing between movement law and movement actors).
124 See Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and
Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443, 447–48 (2001) (discussing a paradigm for social change
demphasizing the role of traditional legal practice in favor of community-directed
advocacy).
125 See Kate Andrias & Benjamin I. Sachs, Constructing Countervailing Power: Law and
Organizing in an Era of Political Inequality, 130 YALE L.J. 546, 556 (2021) (“Indeed, for
those who are committed to decreasing political inequality, alternative legal structures that
encourage the growth of countervailing organizations are imperative.”).
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service of social movements, movement lawyers engage in bold and
creative arguments that can open new jurisprudential avenues for
movement judges. By remaining in touch with such bottom-up citizen
democracy, movement judges can avoid the authoritarian tendencies
of the judiciary while applying abolition constitutionalism. This Part
will explore the accomplishments and goals of Black Lives Matter,
prison abolition, critical feminism, environmental justice, and the
union movement as examples before addressing the structures they
challenge, the legal barriers to their goals, and the potential for movement judges to clear their paths forward.
A. A Selection of Liberationist Movements
Black Lives Matter (BLM) is an “ideological and political intervention in a world where Black lives are systemically and intentionally
targeted for demise.”126 In 2013, Alicia Garza, Patrisse Cullors, and
Opal Tometi created #BlackLivesMatter in response to the acquittal
of Trayvon Martin’s murderer, George Zimmerman.127 The movement became prominent as police tragically continued killing innocent
Black people.128 Its mission is simple, yet resounding: to eradicate
white supremacy and protect those suffering from it.129 In some ways,
BLM is like the Black-led resistances of the past—united by a
common motive and push for equality.130 BLM was inspired by the
1960s civil rights movement and the 1980s Black Feminist movement,
as well as the Pan-African movement, political hip-hop movement,
126 Herstory, BLACK LIVES MATTER, https://blacklivesmatter.com/herstory [https://
perma.cc/JM3Y-QDKV].
127 Id.
128 See Caitlin O’Kane, “Say Their Names”: The List of People Injured or Killed in
Officer-Involved Incidents Is Still Growing, CBS NEWS (June 8, 2020), https://
www.cbsnews.com/news/say-their-names-list-people-injured-killed-police-officer-involvedincidents [https://perma.cc/H57R-BWHF] (describing the social media response to killings
by police). For a list of victims of police brutality alongside an artistic rendering, see Alia
Chughtai, Know Their Names: Black People Killed by the Police in the US, AL JAZEERA,
https://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/2020/know-their-names/index.html [https://perma.cc/
3Q73-84W6].
129 See Herstory, supra note 126.
130 See Verena Daniel, How the BLM Movement Compares to the MLK Jr. Era Civil
Rights Movement, STATE NEWS (Jan. 18, 2021), https://statenews.com/article/2021/01/blmcompared-to-mlk-era-civil-rights?ct=content_open&cv=Cb]ox_latest [https://perma.cc/
M2T9-F57V] (“Although there are several differences in the civil rights and BLM
movements, their common motive and methods show a clear continuation in the push for
equality from the MLK days to now.”); see also Ian Thomsen, How Do Today’s Black
Lives Matter Protests Compare to the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s?,
NEWS@NORTHEASTERN (June 4, 2020), https://news.northeastern.edu/2020/06/04/how-dotodays-black-lives-matter-protests-compare-to-the-civil-rights-movement-of-the-1960s
[https://perma.cc/RQ46-8UHQ] (evaluating the similarities between the national crises of
the civil rights era and the present).
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and the 2000s LGBTQ+ movement.131 But unlike its MLK-era predecessors, BLM is “leader-full,” consisting of decentralized groups
across the world, rather than a travelling body of leaders.132 This permits BLM to respond more rapidly and share its message beyond
America’s borders.
Growing sick of America’s reliance on concrete boxes for punishment, abolitionists work tirelessly to eradicate them.133 Renowned
abolitionist Mariame Kaba defines prison abolition as “the complete
and utter dismantling of prisons, policing, and surveillance as they
exist within our culture. And it’s also the building up of new ways of
. . . relating with each other.”134 Abolitionists pursue a society that
actually provides liberty and justice for all.135 Accomplishing this
means tearing down the walls this county has built to hide today’s
enslaved people.136
From the suffragette movement in the early 1900s to the reproductive and workers rights movements in the 1960s, feminism has
swelled and retracted over the past century.137 Now, in the wake of
131 Isabella Mercado, The Black Lives Matter Movement: An Origin Story,
UNDERGROUND R.R. HISTORY, https://undergroundrailroadhistory.org/the-black-livesmatter-movement-an-origin-story [https://perma.cc/RQ46-8UHQ].
132 See Daniel, supra note 130 (“[BLM] is a ‘leader-full’ movement that prizes
collaboration over having one central figure . . . . [T]here is coordination and a set of
shared values spread across a decentralized structure that prizes local connections and fast
mobilization in response to police violence.”).
133 See John Washington, What Is Prison Abolition?, NATION (July 31, 2018), https://
www.thenation.com/article/archive/what-is-prison-abolition [https://perma.cc/XB4FKV9M] (“[A] growing collection of activists and writers have not only been working to
humanize the cages, and not only to tear down the cages, but to build a more equitable
society in which we don’t need to rely on cages at all.”); Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, The
Emerging Movement for Police and Prison Abolition, NEW YORKER (May 7, 2021), https://
www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-emerging-movement-for-police-and-prisonabolition [https://perma.cc/SYV9-CX72] (quoting Kaba as explaining that “I am looking to
abolish what I consider to be death-making institutions, which are policing, imprisonment,
sentencing, and surveillance”).
134 Allegra M. McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1613,
1617 (2019) (citing Episode 29 - Mariame Kaba, AIRGO (Feb. 2, 2016), https://
airgoradio.com/airgo/2016/2/2/episode-29-mariame-kaba [https://perma.cc/GTC7-PN34]).
135 Ruth Wilson Gilmore & James Kilgore, The Case for Abolition, MARSHALL PROJECT
(June 19, 2019), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/06/19/the-case-for-abolition
[https://perma.cc/8KQ9-PMFK] (“We want a society that centers freedom and justice
instead of profit and punishment.”).
136 ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? 103 (2003) (“Despite the important
gains of antiracist social movements over the last half century, racism hides from view
within institutional structures, and its most reliable refuge is the prison system.”).
137 See Prue Clarke, Stuck on the Third? A Guide to Fourth Wave Feminism, FUTURE
WOMEN, https://futurewomen.com/leadership/gender-diversity/fourth-wave-feminismguide [https://perma.cc/V4JJ-LSUQ] (describing the different waves of feminist
movements of the last century).
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#MeToo138 and Time’s Up,139 an unprecedented amount of discussion
about women’s rights issues is taking place.140 This new wave, known
as fourth wave feminism, is larger by design. Where early feminist
movements elevated white cisgender straight women, modern feminism seeks to be more inclusive.141 Generally speaking, today’s feminists work to create a world that supports women—“including Black
women, indigenous women, poor women, immigrant women, disabled
women, lesbian, queer, bisexual and trans women, and women of
every religious, non-religious, and atheist background”142—by eliminating shared injustices. The movement’s focus areas include glass
ceilings,143 rape culture,144 harassment,145 objectification,146 domestic
violence,147 and reproductive rights,148 among other issues.
138 For more information on #MeToo, see Tarana Burke, History & Inception, ME TOO,
https://metoomvmt.org/get-to-know-us/history-inception [https://perma.cc/7H28-8XHY].
139 For more information on Time’s Up, see Our Story, TIME’S UP, https://
timesupnow.org/about/our-story [https://perma.cc/7KGR-DET4].
140 See Clarke, supra note 137 (“But in the last year, as #MeToo and Time’s Up gained
momentum and a record number of women prepared to run for office, it’s clear feminism
was reaching a level of cultural relevance it hadn’t enjoyed in years.”).
141 See Jessica Abrahams, Everything You Wanted to Know About Fourth Wave
Feminism—But Were Afraid to Ask, PROSPECT MAG. (Aug. 14, 2017), https://
www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/everything-wanted-know-fourth-wave-feminism
[https://perma.cc/9UER-GJFB] (“These questions are part of a broader debate on
‘intersectionality’—the idea that different groups of women experience oppression in
different ways—and the criticism that feminism has often been dominated by the concerns
of the privileged.”).
142 See About Us, WOMEN’S MARCH GLOB., https://womensmarchglobal.org/about
[https://perma.cc/CDU3-7JXC].
143 See Marilyn Loden, 100 Women: ‘Why I Invented the Glass Ceiling Phrase,’ BBC
NEWS (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-42026266 [https://perma.cc/A3UAH76K] (“The term ‘glass ceiling’ refers to the sometimes-invisible barrier to success that
many women come up against in their careers.”).
144 See Reina Gattuso, Rape Culture Is a Contract We Never Actually Signed,
FEMINISTING (May 26, 2015), http://feministing.com/2015/05/26/rape-culture-is-a-contractwe-never-actually-signed [https://perma.cc/YMQ5-HGW7] (“Sometimes there’s a moment
when I’m having sex that I think a lot of us have felt . . . . It’s the fear that, if I asked the
person to stop, they wouldn’t.”).
145 See Moira Donegan, How #MeToo Revealed the Central Rift Within Feminism
Today, GUARDIAN (May 11, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/may/11/howmetoo-revealed-the-central-rift-within-feminism-social-individualist [https://perma.cc/
FEH3-B3GH] (“By saying ‘me too’, an individual woman makes herself a part of a
broader group, and chooses to stand with others who have been harassed, assaulted or
raped. This solidarity is powerful.”).
146 See Ronnie Ritchie, How Can You Tell If You’re Being Sexually Empowered or
Objectified? Ask Yourself This Simple Question, EVERYDAY FEMINISM (Apr. 14, 2015),
https://everydayfeminism.com/2015/04/empowered-vs-objectified [https://perma.cc/Z5GKCAPF] (exploring the role of power and consent in distinguishing between sexual
empowerment and sexual objectification).
147 See Hazel Cills, When Are Police Officers Going to Stop Underestimating the Link
Between Domestic Violence and Murder?, JEZEBEL (Dec. 10, 2018), https://jezebel.com/
when-are-police-officers-going-to-stop-underestimating-1830981823 [https://perma.cc/
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Environmentalism is a movement that crosses party lines more
than others.149 The movement dates to 1907 with the coinage of the
term “conservation movement” in response to egregious forest
exploitation.150 “Save the forests” sounds simple. But this sentiment
was rooted in the more complex notion that the earth was being ravaged for the benefit of the few at the expense of all; the natural earth,
with green trees and blue waters, should be the public domain.151
Since then, the conservation movement has grown to focus on climate
change.152 Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s Green New Deal reaches
toward the broad goals of modern environmentalists.153 Its aim is to
“reduce greenhouse gas emissions in order to avoid the worst consequences of climate change while also trying to fix societal problems
like economic inequality and racial injustice.”154 Like the forest conservation movement at the turn of the previous century, today’s environmental movement is conscious of the interaction between the
needs of people and the planet.155 Notably, advocates are more conWB6F-5F9N] (“As we’ve seen just this year in the murders of women like Aisha Fraser,
Tiffany Wilson, Tamara O’Neal, and Jaelynn Willey, and multiple studies, there is a direct
link between domestic violence and murdered women in this country . . . .”).
148 See Kylie Cheung, The Feminist Argument for Court Expansion, MARY SUE (Oct. 27,
2020), https://www.themarysue.com/feminist-argument-court-expansion [https://perma.cc/
4GUS-A8ZF] (“In red states and blue states alike, women—and disproportionately
women of color—already face criminal charges and have even been jailed for miscarriages,
stillbirths, ‘pregnancy-endangering’ behaviors, and self-managed abortions.”).
149 See Grant McConnell, The Environmental Movement: Ambiguities and Meanings, 11
NAT. RES. J. 427, 427 (1971) (“The supporters of ‘ecology’ . . . are a very mixed lot; they
include individuals and groups from both the left and the right, as well as from the
amorphous center.”).
150 Id. at 428.
151 See id. at 429–30.
152 See Dana R. Fisher & Sohana Nasrin, Climate Activism and Its Effects, 12 WIRES
CLIMATE CHANGE 1 (2021), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/wcc.683
[https://perma.cc/UZ6U-V5NL] (describing the growth of climate activism).
153 See Lisa Friedman, What Is the Green New Deal? A Climate Proposal, Explained,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/21/climate/green-new-dealquestions-answers.html [https://perma.cc/8XQS-X689].
154 Id.
155 See Ed Potosnak, Opinion, This Juneteenth, Let’s Look at Race and the
Environmental Movement, NJ.COM (June 18, 2021), https://www.nj.com/opinion/2021/06/
this-juneteenth-lets-look-at-race-and-the-environmental-movement-opinion.html [https://
perma.cc/N4GH-23MS] (“Clean energy will not only improve our air and water quality but
is one of the fastest-growing industries in America and provides a huge opportunity for
high-quality union jobs that can help rebuild the middle class and provide new
opportunities . . . [for] workers in Black and [B]rown communities.”); Audrey Nakagawa,
Out for Sustainability: The Intersection of the LGBTQIA+ and Environmental Movements,
ECOWATCH (July 7, 2021), https://www.ecowatch.com/out-for-sustainability2653703495.html [https://perma.cc/R9A8-7MNF] (discussing how environmental issues and
social justice are intimately tied together).
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frontational than those of the past—and more diverse.156 Shedding
the “mainstream environmentalism” image of being too elite, white,
and focused on scenery is a critical element of achieving environmental justice.157 It emblazons the group’s organizing principle that
“everything is connected.”158
The labor movement—or union movement—was born in
response to exploitive business practices used against employees.159 It
grew out of the desperate need to protect the common worker’s
interest against that of industry.160 Because the voices of many are
more powerful than a lone voice, labor unions were formed to fight
for increased wages, reasonable hours, and safe working conditions.161
Today, strong labor unions engage in sectoral bargaining, where
workers and unions negotiate with employers and their associations
across entire industries regionally or nationally (e.g., auto manufacturing, health care, education, etc.).162 This permits unions to improve
the lives of both union and nonunion workers.163 Centralized bargaining of this type results in progress and is exemplified by the House
of Representatives’ recent passage of the Protecting the Right to
Organize (PRO) Act on March 9th, 2021.164 Although the PRO Act
faces an uphill battle before the U.S. Senate, the step forward symbolizes the country’s shifting perspective towards unions.165
156 See Jedediah Britton-Purdy, Environmentalism Was Once a Social-Justice Movement,
ATLANTIC (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2016/12/how-theenvironmental-movement-can-recover-its-soul/509831 [https://perma.cc/J9UE-EREC]
(“The incoming Trump administration is likely to see the greatest revival of
environmentalism as a confrontational, grassroots, sometimes radical movement since at
least 1970, when more than a million people took part in the first Earth Day.”).
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 See Labor Movement, HISTORY (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.history.com/topics/19thcentury/labor [https://perma.cc/BS4M-44LY] (“The earliest recorded strike occurred in
1768 when New York journeymen tailors protested a wage reduction.”).
160 Id.
161 See id. (discussing the history of labor organizing in the United States).
162 See Trent McDonald, Why Sectoral Bargaining Matters for the Labor Movement,
JACOBIN (July 4, 2021), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2021/07/sectoral-national-industrywide-bargaining-contracts-us-unions [https://perma.cc/8DJ4-82LJ].
163 See id. (outlining how higher union membership leads to higher wages, better
benefits, and more workplace democracy for both union and nonunion workers).
164 Id.
165 See Don Gonyea, House Democrats Pass Bill That Would Protect Worker
Organizing Efforts, NPR (Mar. 9, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/03/09/975259434/housedemocrats-pass-bill-that-would-protect-worker-organizing-efforts [https://perma.cc/RJ797KNV] (discussing the PRO Act); Sarah Jones, The PRO Act Could Do More Than Revive
Unions, N.Y. MAG.: INTELLIGENCER (Mar. 13, 2021), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2021/
03/what-is-the-pro-act.html [https://perma.cc/E8RK-98QP] (same).

May 2022]

MOVEMENT JUDGES

661

B. The Strategies of Liberationist Movements Demand Movement
Judges
All of these movements embrace a variety of strategies to challenge the status quo. They must, for those who benefit from the status
quo can bring considerable resources to bear in its defense; money can
buy them media influence,166 political influence,167 and excellent lawyers.168 Corporate media and policy groups continue to fuel racism in
America.169 Prisons rely on racism and classism to maintain their relevance.170 Statistics illustrating the gross disparity between imprisoned
166 See Paul Farhi, Washington Post Closes Sale to Amazon Founder Jeff Bezos, WASH.
POST (Oct. 1, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/washington-postcloses-sale-to-amazon-founder-jeff-bezos/2013/10/01/fca3b16a-2acf-11e3-97a3ff2758228523_story.html [https://perma.cc/Y22X-LFSX] (reporting the transfer of the
newspaper to the billionaire for $250 million); Timothy Burke, How America’s Largest
Local TV Owner Turned Its News Anchors into Soldiers in Trump’s War on the Media,
DEADSPIN (Mar. 31, 2018), https://deadspin.com/how-americas-largest-local-tv-ownerturned-its-news-anc-1824233490 [https://perma.cc/2PPJ-U2SU] (describing how broadcast
giant Sinclair uses over 200 local television stations to broadcast its political commentary).
167 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (forbidding regulation of
independent corporate political expenditures); Andrew Prokop, 40 Charts That Explain
Money in Politics, VOX (July 30, 2014), https://www.vox.com/2014/7/30/5949581/money-inpolitics-charts-explain [https://perma.cc/4CGJ-5EUW] (“Money suffuses our political
system. . . . Some studies have found companies can get as much as a 22,000 percent return
on their lobbying dollars . . . .”).
168 See Kathryn Rubino, Biglaw Firms Are Charging How Much? For ASSOCIATES?,
ABOVE THE LAW (May 26, 2020), https://abovethelaw.com/2020/05/biglaw-firms-arecharging-how-much-for-associates [https://perma.cc/Q6JM-G5YA] (discussing hourly rates
for associates’ time of over $1,000 from Kirkland & Ellis, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &
Flom, and Weil, Gotshal & Manges); Sammy Roth, Meet the Law Firms Helping Fossil
Fuel Companies Heat the Planet, L.A. TIMES: BOILING POINT (Aug. 19, 2021), https://
www.latimes.com/environment/newsletter/2021-08-19/meet-the-law-firms-helping-fossilfuel-companies-heat-the-planet-boiling-point [https://perma.cc/JWF2-Y3ZF] (noting that
Vault 100 law firms represented major polluters in at least 350 suits and $1.36 trillion of
fossil fuel transactions between 2016 and 2020).
169 See Rashad Robinson, Opinion, Corporations Profit from Racism. It’s Time for Us to
Stand Up to Them, GUARDIAN (May 16, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2019/may/16/racial-justice-corporations [https://perma.cc/HD68-6PBQ]
(“What goes unreported too often, however, is the role of corporations in sustaining, or
worsening, the forces of racism in America.”); Robert B. Reich, Opinion, Who Profits from
Racism, RICHMOND CNTY. DAILY J. (June 15, 2020), https://www.yourdailyjournal.com/
opinion/94848/robert-reich-who-profits-from-racism [https://perma.cc/7M2K-883Y]
(detailing ongoing racist practices at some of America’s largest and most profitable
corporations).
170 See Angela Y. Davis, Masked Racism: Reflections on the Prison Industrial Complex,
COLORLINES (Sept. 10, 1998) [hereinafter Davis, Masked Racism], https://
www.colorlines.com/articles/masked-racism-reflections-prison-industrial-complex [https://
perma.cc/4WPY-WTEZ] (“Once the aura of magic is stripped away from the
imprisonment solution, what is revealed is racism, class bias, and the parasitic seduction of
capitalist profit.”).
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people of color and white people are widely known.171 Incarceration
shatters the lives of millions172—particularly young Black and Brown
men—but fails to deter crime.173 But nothing is done because prisons
operate as intended. 174 They abuse the enslavement loophole created
by the Thirteenth Amendment175 and return enormous profits to
those in charge.176 Sexism remains similarly profitable.177 And
exploiting the environment remains a strong business model: “Just 100
171 See Wendy Sawyer, Visualizing the Racial Disparities in Mass Incarceration, PRISON
POL’Y INITIATIVE (July 27, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2020/07/27/disparities
[https://perma.cc/5XZ9-XCW7] (including statistics on racial disparities in prisons,
policing, and arrests); ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE COLOR OF
JUSTICE: RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITY IN STATE PRISONS (2021), https://www.
sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/The-Color-of-Justice-Racial-andEthnic-Disparity-in-State-Prisons.pdf [https://perma.cc/2G52-5ZBH] (same).
172 See Camonghne Felix, Aching for Abolition: As a Survivor of Sexual Violence, I
Know Prison Isn’t the Answer, CUT: ONE GREAT STORY (Oct. 1, 2020), https://
www.thecut.com/2020/10/aching-for-abolition.html [https://perma.cc/63YK-NA7P] (“I
knew what prison was. I knew that horrible, bad things happened there. That sometimes
people were starved to death, or beaten to death, or sexually assaulted until they killed
themselves.”).
173 See Bob Yirka, Study Suggests Imprisonment Does Not Deter Future Crime,
PHYS.ORG (May 14, 2019), https://phys.org/news/2019-05-imprisonment-deter-futurecrime.html [https://perma.cc/9YXG-VNBN] (summarizing study finding evidence that
imprisonment does not deter crime); NAT’L INST. OF JUST., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FIVE
THINGS ABOUT DETERRENCE 1 (May 2016), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/247350.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6KPT-59LX] (“Sending an individual convicted of a crime to prison isn’t
a very effective way to deter crime.”).
174 See Davis, Masked Racism, supra note 170 (“Mass incarceration is not a solution to
unemployment, nor is it a solution to the vast array of social problems that are hidden
away in a rapidly growing network of prisons and jails.”).
175 See Caroline M. Kisiel, Loopholes Have Preserved Slavery for More than 150 Years
After Abolition, WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/
2021/01/27/loopholes-have-preserved-slavery-more-than-150-years-after-abolition [https://
perma.cc/39PS-U44S] (discussing how the Thirteenth Amendment operates as a loophole);
Cristal Mesa, Yes, The Thirteenth Amendment Really Does Have a Loophole that Allows
Slavery—Just Look at Our Prison System, MITÚ (June 19, 2020), https://wearemitu.com/
wearemitu/entertainment/yes-the-thirteenth-amendment-really-does-have-a-loophole-thatallows-slavery-just-look-at-our-prison-system [https://perma.cc/UY6Z-VEH8] (“Today’s
so-called prison systems are indeed just slavery of a different name.”).
176 See Davis, Masked Racism, supra note 170 (“As prisons proliferate in U.S. society,
private capital has become enmeshed in the punishment industry. And precisely because of
their profit potential, prisons are becoming increasingly important to the U.S. economy.”);
see also Rupert Neate, Welcome to Jail Inc: How Private Companies Make Money off US
Prisons, GUARDIAN (June 16, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jun/16/usprisons-jail-private-healthcare-companies-profit [https://perma.cc/V32H-8LH6] (“Getting
locked up is unlikely to be good for your health but it’s ‘terrific, terrific’ business for the
booming private industry supplying doctors and nurses to jails and prisons.”); Hauwa
Ahmed, How Private Prisons Are Profiting Under the Trump Administration, CTR. AM.
PROGRESS (Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/reports/
2019/08/30/473966/private-prisons-profiting-trump-administration [https://perma.cc/K24ARZGD] (“[One private prison company] and its employees have spent about $3 million on
campaign contributions to federal candidates and PACs since 1990. Eighty-five percent of
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companies have been the source of more than 70% of the world’s
greenhouse gas emissions since 1988 . . . .”178 The ruling elite
demonize unions because they are—when allowed to operate and
organize unfettered—so effective at shifting wealth and power downward.179 Unfortunately, one of the unifying themes of these popular
social movements is the tremendous wealth arrayed against them.
There is little reason to believe that judges drawn from the same
pool of corporate attorneys and prosecutors would tend to break with
the status quo. But when these movements and their allies bring legal
challenges, movement judges can be more receptive to their arguments. BLM’s rise to prominence has reinvigorated legal scholarship
on the racial inequities of our justice system.180 Movement lawyers are
[the company’s] contributions to federal candidates since 1990 have gone to Republicans
. . . .” (footnote omitted)).
177 See Catherine Clifford, Global Wealth Inequality is “Founded on Sexism,” Says
Oxfam International, CNBC (Jan. 19, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/17/globalwealth-inequality-is-founded-on-sexism-oxfam-international.html [https://perma.cc/G9FYKSSP] (reporting on how men have used their position of social dominance to control fifty
percent more of global wealth than women); Lee Dye, How Sexist Men Profit, ABC NEWS
(Sept. 23, 2008), https://abcnews.go.com/Technology/AheadoftheCurve/story?id=5868121&
page=1 [https://perma.cc/UGJ5-GND5] (detailing the salary advantages that men with
sexist attitudes enjoy over their egalitarian counterparts); Kelly Gilblom, Activision,
Battling Workplace Controversy, Beats Estimates, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 3, 2021), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-08-03/activision-battling-sexism-complaints-topsanalysts-estimates [https://perma.cc/L842-2982] (“Activision Blizzard Inc., the video-game
giant currently at the center of controversy over harassment and sexism in the industry,
reported quarterly results that beat Wall Street projections and raised its outlook for the
year.”).
178 Tess Riley, Just 100 Companies Responsible for 71% of Global Emissions, Study
Says, GUARDIAN (July 10, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2017/
jul/10/100-fossil-fuel-companies-investors-responsible-71-global-emissions-cdp-studyclimate-change [https://perma.cc/UZ7G-B9MA].
179 See McDonald, supra note 162. This is probably why corporations are scared to
death of unions and work so hard to prevent them from proliferating. See GORDON LAFER
& LOLA LOUSTAUNAU, ECON. POL’Y INST., FEAR AT WORK 1 (July 23, 2020), https://
www.epi.org/publication/fear-at-work-how-employers-scare-workers-out-of-unionizing
[https://perma.cc/S7M8-Y5M4] (“Employers—including many respectable, name-brand
companies—collectively spend $340 million per year on ‘union avoidance’ consultants who
teach them how to exploit these weakness[es] of federal labor law to effectively scare
workers out of exercising their legal right to collective bargaining.”).
180 See, e.g., Frank Rudy Cooper, Cop Fragility and Blue Lives Matter, 2020 U. ILL. L.
REV. 621, 631 (“Had there been no uprisings in Ferguson (and Baltimore), there would
have been much less attention paid to why [B]lack people are so angry about policing.”);
Amna A. Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405, 407–08
(2018) (“In conversations with intellectuals and organizers around the country, I realized
the Movement for Black Lives (M4BL or Movement)—the larger movement configuration
in which the chapter-based Black Lives Matter network functions—was having a far richer
and more imaginative conversation about law reform than lawyers and law faculty.”
(footnote omitted)); Osagie K. Obasogie & Zachary Newman, Black Lives Matter and
Respectability Politics in Local News Accounts of Officer-Involved Civilian Deaths: An
Early Empirical Assessment, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 541, 543 (“At the heart of the Black Lives
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taking notice and adopting arguments influenced by this scholarship.181 And movement judges are responding in their opinions.182
The application of abolition constitutionalism will aid in bringing
about an end to racist policing and establishing a basis for colorconscious remedies such as reparations.183 If abolition constitutionalism is to bear fruit for racial justice, the courts will need movement
judges to tend to the project.
Prison abolitionists’ willingness to fight for a series of small victories rather than attempting to achieve the abolition of the carceral
state overnight lends itself to the litigation strategy successfully
deployed in the civil rights movement leading up to Brown v. Board of
Education 184 and the ACLU’s women’s rights advocacy in the
1970s.185 The slow process of shifting constitutional interpretation to
protect individuals in ways not previously recognized benefits tremenMatter movement is the insistence that regardless of any perceived non-respectable
behavior—from Walter Scott evading a police officer during a traffic stop to Sandra
Bland’s non-compliant interactions with an officer—their lives matter and should not be
treated with deadly disregard.”); Mitchell F. Crusto, Black Lives Matter: Banning Police
Lynchings, 48 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 3, 5–6 (2020) (“The Movement demands an end to
racial injustice and oppression in America, with a particular emphasis on stopping police
brutality against Black people and eradicating systemic racism.” (footnote omitted)); Erin
Cloud, Rebecca Oyama & Lauren Teichner, Family Defense in the Age of Black Lives
Matter, 20 CUNY L. REV. F. 68, 88 (2017) (“The BLM’s ‘Campaign Zero’ platform lists
ten specific policy solutions for which BLM advocates should campaign in their
jurisdictions, but strikingly does not yet address any child welfare policy reforms.”).
181 See, e.g., Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 15, Oliva v. Nivar, 141 S. Ct. 2669 (2021) (mem.) (order denying
petition for writ of certiorari) (No. 20-1060), 2021 WL 870557, at *15 (citing scholarship on
racist policing influenced by BLM); Brief of the DKT Liberty Project et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 13, Lange v. California, 141 S. Ct. 2011 (2021) (No. 2018), 2020 WL 7388348, at *13 (citing scholarship on community perceptions of the
legitimacy of law enforcement).
182 See, e.g., Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2069–71 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(citing a veritable bookshelf of Critical Race Theory scholarship to explore the collateral
consequences of the majority’s decision); Jamison v. McClendon, 476 F. Supp. 3d 386,
390–92 (S.D. Miss. 2020) (criticizing qualified immunity for its role in perpetuating
systemic racism in an opinion citing to Derrick Bell, Sherrilyn Ifill, and Fred O. Smith, Jr.,
among others); United States v. Curry, 965 F.3d 313, 332–34 (4th Cir. 2020) (Gregory, C.J.,
concurring) (taking Judge Wilkinson’s dissent to task for failing to understand the realities
faced by racial minorities with citations from scholars stretching from Frederick Douglass
to James Baldwin to Michelle Alexander).
183 See Roberts, supra note 3, at 122 n.750 (discussing the alternative constitutionalism
of Black radicals as a basis for reparations and changes in police power).
184 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
185 See Serena Mayeri, Constitutional Choices: Legal Feminism and the Historical
Dynamics of Change, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 755, 763–64 (2004) (“After conducting extensive
legal research, [Pauli] Murray proposed a litigation strategy modeled on the civil rights
movement’s successful transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s judicial
meaning. . . . Murray sought to emulate the success of organizations like the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund in winning rights through organized litigation.”).

May 2022]

MOVEMENT JUDGES

665

dously from judges—and especially Supreme Court Justices—who are
amenable to such shifts. To the extent that modern abolition relies
upon expansive interpretation of the Constitution, movement judges
can play an integral role in completing the project.
The feminist movement has a demonstrated history of benefiting
from movement lawyering and movement judges.186 While feminists
have won significant victories in prior litigation, a potentially gamechanging dispute looms if Congress modifies its time limit for passage
of the Equal Rights Amendment, creating an opportunity to ratify
it.187 Even if the ratification is considered valid, further interpretive
battles await movement lawyers. The ERA’s concept of “sex” is broad
enough to include gender and sexuality,188 but as with the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court could willfully ignore this publicly understood
meaning.189 Abolition constitutionalism would interpret the ERA
with the same urgency it brings to the Reconstruction Amendments,
ensuring its intersectional application. We need movement judges to
ensure that courts will respect the intended breadth of the ERA and
to preserve feminist victories elsewhere.
Environmental law is particularly susceptible to judicial interpretation, as it consists almost entirely of individual statutes and regulations.190 While Congress’s Commerce Clause power is likely sufficient
to support most environmental regulation,191 this does not guarantee a
favorable interpretation for environmentalists. Shifting agency regula186 See Serena Mayeri, The Strange Career of Jane Crow: Sex Segregation and the
Transformation of Anti-Discrimination Discourse, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMANS. 187, 228–30
(2006) (describing the rapid shift in jurisprudence and legislation regarding sex
discrimination at the urging of activists and movement lawyers in the 1970s).
187 See generally THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42979, THE PROPOSED
EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT: CONTEMPORARY RATIFICATION ISSUES (2019), https://
fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42979.pdf [https://perma.cc/2237-4473] (discussing numerous
arguments for and against considering the Equal Rights Amendment to be validly ratified
if Congress modified its initial time limit).
188 See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1750–51 (2020) (“[D]uring debates
over the [ERA], others counseled that its language—which was strikingly similar to Title
VII’s—might also protect homosexuals from discrimination.”).
189 See generally The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (interpreting
narrowly the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as pertaining
only to privileges and immunities conferred by U.S. citizenship); The Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3 (1883) (invalidating portions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 based on a narrow
reading of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments).
190 See David A. Westbrook, Liberal Environmental Jurisprudence, 27 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 619, 621 (1994) (“Environmental law has no explicit unifying principles that could
serve to organize the jumble of statutes, regulations, cases, and academic analyses that
collectively form the academic subject of environmental law.”).
191 See Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Law Outside the Canon, 89 IND. L.J. 1239, 1260
n.127 (2014) (“EPA statutes operate largely under the authority of the Commerce Clause;
natural resource statutes operate largely under the authority of the Property Clause.”).
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tions and novel interpretive arguments can potentially undermine
apparently robust statutory regimes.192 Even if movement judges only
serve to enforce environmental laws in their intended scope, that
would significantly aid the cause of the environmental movement.
Like environmental law, much of labor law relies upon statutory
protections—statutes the courts have largely rendered toothless.193
Courts are hesitant to defer to the statutory authority of the National
Labor Relations Board, particularly when collective rights are at
stake.194 Yet a broad interpretation of constitutional rights has the
potential to provide a better solution: “The freedom of association
model incorporates a central lesson of the experience under the
NLRA, namely that using the law to institutionalize any particular
model or models of worker organization runs a high risk—
approaching a certitude—of choking the movement as conditions
change.”195 The freedom of association model draws from both the
labor movement’s history and its international analogs while providing stronger protections to existing unions, workers who seek to
unionize, and workers who do not wish to join a union.196 In the
wrong hands, though, the Constitution can be used to achieve
Lochner-like union-busting.197 Abolition constitutionalism provides
movement judges with the means to distinguish between constitutional interpretations that curtail associative rights or render statutes a
192 See The Clean Water Case of the Century, EARTHJUSTICE (Oct. 2021), https://
earthjustice.org/features/supreme-court-maui-clean-water-case [https://perma.cc/C29Y836N] (“If the Supreme Court had sided with Maui County and overturned the Ninth
Circuit’s ruling, it would have allowed industry to freely pollute U.S. waters as long as the
pollution isn’t directly discharged into a water source.”).
193 See Benjamin I. Sachs, Despite Preemption: Making Labor Law in Cities and States,
124 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1154–55 (2011) (“[T]he prevailing view of contemporary labor
law is that although the NLRA is a failed statute, the possibility for state and local
innovation is choked off by one of the most expansive preemption regimes in American
law.”).
194 See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 1527, 1564 (2002) (“Even when the Board is operating within the constraints of
language and precedent, the courts give the NLRB a rather short leash, one that often
strangles innovation. . . . [T]he judicial leash is shortest—at least since the 1960s—when it
is the most ‘collective’ of labor’s rights that are at stake.”).
195 Jim Pope, Next Wave Organizing and the Shift to a New Paradigm of Labor Law, 50
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 515, 535 (2006).
196 See id. at 543–45 (exploring the details of the freedom of association model of labor
organizing).
197 See Erin Mayo Adam, The Supreme Court Struck Down a Key United Farm Workers
Win. The Decision Has Some Infamous Echoes., WASH. POST (July 2, 2021), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/07/02/supreme-court-struck-down-key-unitedfarm-workers-win-decision-has-some-infamous-echoes [https://perma.cc/79AJ-EUN5]
(discussing the resemblance of the Supreme Court’s recent anti-labor decisions to the
Lochner era’s reasoning for curtailing workers’ rights).

May 2022]

MOVEMENT JUDGES

667

dead letter, concentrating bargaining power in the hands of the
wealthy, and a rights-affirming vision of the Constitution that enables
workers to benefit from its guarantees. With the Roberts Court’s
penchant for pro-business decisions, our labor rights may well depend
on the work of movement judges.
Advancing these specific movements’ goals is far from the only
benefit of appointing movement judges. All of them seek to build a
more just society. Movement judges aren’t good for society because
they aid the causes of these social movements; the movements benefit
from the overall fairer application of the law. Popular social movements regularly inspire legal academics to explore new legal structures, which in turn can blaze a trail for judges—this is, after all,
analogous to the development of originalism or law and economics.
But unlike those legal philosophies—which all too often merely serve
to justify inequitable concentrations of wealth and power—movement
law promotes a vision of justice whose protections extend to all.
Movement judges provide attorneys working toward that public good
a receptive audience while remaining fully aware of the human import
of any legal proceeding.
III
MOVEMENT JUDGES
“It is the chief glory of Courts of Justice, that they are regarded as the
safest sanctuaries of Human Freedom. May such ever be the honorable
distinction of this court!”
—Salmon P. Chase, 1847198
Between the courts’ captivity by anti-democratic forces and the
prominence and popularity of rights-affirming mass movements, the
stakes could not be higher. Reactionary courts can diminish constitutional protections, deny Congress the authority to protect individuals
by limiting congressional powers, and prevent states from taking up
the baton through strained interpretations of the Constitution. Movement judges, by contrast, can find broad protections of individual
rights within the Constitution, adopt a permissive stance toward congressional protection of individual rights, and apply cooperative federalist principles toward complementary state legislation. Even at the
state level, judges can apply similar reasoning to interpret and enforce
rights-affirming provisions of state constitutions and statutes.
198 S.P. CHASE, RECLAMATION OF FUGITIVES FROM SERVICE: AN ARGUMENT FOR THE
DEFENDANT, SUBMITTED TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, AT THE
DECEMBER TERM, 1846, IN THE CASE OF Wharton Jones v. John Vanzandt 107 (1847).
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Because of the court system’s hierarchical nature, it is impossible
to ignore the impact the nine Supreme Court Justices have.199 And
while they have the power to drive progress,200 they can equally wreak
havoc.201 Lately, the Court has occupied its time by bludgeoning justice.202 Fully aware, conservative groups and states are challenging
vulnerable human rights with the explicit intent of eradicating them.
For example, Mississippi’s Attorney General recently asked the
Supreme Court to overturn Roe v. Wade.203 Terrifyingly—but unsur199 See James Pasley, 45 Landmark Supreme Court Cases that Changed American Life as
We Knew It, INSIDER (Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/landmark-ussupreme-court-cases-2019-8 [https://perma.cc/YE55-NF2C] (discussing impactful Supreme
Court cases).
200 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (holding that women could
not be excluded from the citizen-soldier program offered at Virginia Military Institute);
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (holding that states must recognize lawful samesex marriages); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (protecting women’s bodily autonomy by
limiting the power of States to criminalize abortions).
201 For a non-exhaustive list of the Supreme Court’s worst decisions, see generally Dred
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (holding that Black people, whether freed
men or enslaved, could not be considered American citizens), Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200
(1927) (upholding forced sterilization for those with intellectual disabilities), Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the internment of Japanese Americans
during World War II), Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (permitting “separate but
equal” treatment of Black citizens), Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding a
discriminatory Georgia sodomy statute that criminalized sexually active homosexual
relationships), Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down a New York law
limiting bakery work hours to ten hours a day), Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918)
(striking down a federal law banning interstate commerce in products of child labor
because that law exceeded congressional authority), Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S.
469 (2005) (permitting taking land from one private party and giving it to another private
party for economic development as “public use”), Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000)
(halting the vote recount for the 2000 presidential election), United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598 (2000) (destroying parts of the Violence Against Women Act), and Shelby County
v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (ravaging the Voting Rights Act).
202 In the final case of the term, Justice Alito dismantled the remains of the Voting
Rights Act by entirely ignoring the reality of discrimination within the United States. See
Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2339 (2021) (“Small disparities are
less likely . . . to indicate [inequality]. . . . [N]eutral regulations . . . may well result in . . .
disparities in [voting]. But the mere fact [of] disparity in impact does not necessarily
[indicate inequality]. The size of any disparity matters. . . . [A] meaningful comparison is
essential. . . . [V]ery small differences should not be artificially magnified.”); see also Stern,
supra note 56 (discussing how Justice Alito’s opinion in Brnovich destroyed the substance
of the Voting Rights Act); Mary Harris, The Catastrophe of this Supreme Court Term
Should Not Be Underestimated, SLATE (July 7, 2021), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/
2021/07/supreme-court-voting-rights-roberts-alito-brnovich-fulton-bonta.html [https://
perma.cc/U5G9-AYXM] (same); Dahlia Lithwick & Mark Joseph Stern, The Supreme
Court’s Conservatives Have Laid the Groundwork for the Devastation to Come, SLATE
(July 5, 2021), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021/07/supreme-court-conservativesdestroy-voting-rights.html [https://perma.cc/8REA-HJ72] (same).
203 Ariane de Vogue, Mississippi Asks US Supreme Court to Overturn Roe v. Wade,
CNN (July 22, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/07/22/politics/mississippi-roe-v-wadeabortion/index.html [https://perma.cc/4Y2G-ZB4E].
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prisingly—such responses are inevitable when the Court embraces a
reactionary posture. Due to this outsized influence and urgency, this
Part will focus first—but not exclusively—on Supreme Court Justices
to define, distinguish, and explore the work of movement judges.
The scale of the reactionary response highlights the dire importance of the presence of movement judges within our judiciary. This
Part will proceed first with an exploration of what makes a movement
judge, including a discussion of the distinction between a movement
judge and a progressive judge. Next, this Part will explore the work of
several movement judges, past and present, at various levels of the
judiciary. Finally, this Part will discuss abolition constitutionalism’s
potential for a radical reimagining of the scope of the Constitution’s
protections of individual rights. This will elucidate the legal structures
movement judges can use to create a more just society.
A. What Makes a Movement Judge
Movement judges develop their democracy-affirming jurisprudence in solidarity with mass social movements. They embrace abolition constitutionalism, advocating—often in dissent—for greater
protections of fundamental rights. A movement judge applies broad
vision to each case, refusing to ignore the broader legal and factual
implications of a ruling. When difficult questions are squarely
presented in a case, movement judges do not engage in procedural
contortions to avoid addressing them. Movement judges insist that the
anti-democratic structure of the courts should not encourage antidemocratic jurisprudence.
The particular social movements that movement judges stand in
solidarity with have shifted over time, and likely will again. Regardless
of the era, though, these movements share common characteristics.
They are committed to an expansive concept of rights for all, not
merely the powerful and traditionally privileged classes. They
embrace an intersectional approach, understanding that the rights of
one disadvantaged group must not come at the expense of another
and that the effects of discrimination and disparate impact do not
neatly compartmentalize into single-characteristic categories. These
movements are all acutely aware of the law’s role in perpetuating
injustice, so a movement judge’s solidarity with movements would
result in a jurisprudence committed to a democratic reimagining of
the law.
Movement judges’ vision—both of the collateral consequences of
their decisions and of the law’s potential reconstruction—distinguishes them from merely progressive judges. Where a progressive
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judge is committed to a progressive vision of the Constitution, a
movement judge works toward abolition constitutionalism. Progressive constitutionalism treats the Constitution as a set of principles and
applies judicial discretion to determine when to respect or override
the modern, democratic interpretation and implementation of those
principles.204 Abolition constitutionalism, by contrast, considers those
historical principles in conjunction with the means of their implementation and calls on judges to consistently examine the consequences of
applying various means to ensure they are rights- and democracyaffirming. A progressive judge looks to the particular law and facts of
a case and then chooses whether to defer to majoritarian legislative
and executive action or whether to intervene on behalf of higher
ideals of democracy.205 A movement judge, by contrast, views the law
and facts in their full social context, applying consistently democracyaffirming interpretations with an eye to collateral consequences.
The distinction between progressive and movement judges is best
clarified by example. Progressive constitutionalism saw its apex during
the Warren Court, which frequently ruled with more concern for outcomes than for developing a coherent legal theory.206 While the
results were often significant advances for individual rights, they also
included jarringly contradictory limitations in the realm of criminal
procedure.207 This failure of coherence has had dire consequences for
Black and Brown people.208 This must be contrasted with the attention of movement judges to the collateral consequences of their decisions and long-term development of a broader protection of individual
204 See William P. Marshall, Progressive Constitutionalism, Originalism, and the
Significance of Landmark Decisions in Evaluating Constitutional Theory, 72 OHIO ST. L.J.
1251, 1254–56 (2011) (exploring the two major components of progressive
constitutionalism: (i) understanding that the principles underlying the Constitution do not
change but their application does, and (ii) understanding “when the democratic process
requires judicial intervention”).
205 See id.
206 See Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, The Return of Lochner, 100 CORNELL L.
REV. 527, 550 (2015) (“The Warren Court followed . . . Brown with . . . revolutionary
opinions seeking to rectify perceived injustices . . . . The challenge for liberals was how to
reconcile . . . this judicial activity with . . . the cornerstone of liberal constitutional theory—
that judicial deference is essential . . . to avoid the unpalatable error of Lochner.”).
207 See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio’s Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and
Police Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1271, 1309 (1998) (“[Terry] signaled the end of the
Warren Court’s due process revolution. Terry would not be another Miranda. Terry
indicated that the Court was no longer prepared to force change . . . on police departments
and officers who ignored or resisted the application of constitutional commands.”).
208 See id. at 1321 (“[T]hose that have been the most vocal defenders of Terry tend to
come from socio-economic and racial backgrounds that are predominately free from police
harassment. For many [B]lacks and other disfavored groups, however, the Terry Court
wrongly subordinated their Fourth Amendment rights to police safety.”).
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rights. The next Section provides several examples of this, including
Justice McLean’s commitment to the power of states to exclude
slavery within their borders, Justice Brandeis’s vision of freedom of
speech, and Judge Gregory’s efforts to extend Fourth Amendment
protections against racist policing. All these movement judges share a
commitment to a more democratic constitution and the vision to
realize it.
B. Movement Judges Past and Present
Some of the most recognizable examples of movement judges—
particularly in past eras—served as Supreme Court Justices. The original abolitionist movement informed Justices John McLean and
Salmon P. Chase, whose opinions brought the original incarnation of
abolition constitutionalism to Supreme Court jurisprudence. Justice
Louis Brandeis embraced a bold vision of individual rights—especially those of privacy, freedom of speech, and labor—in an era of
overwhelming corporate and government power. Justices Thurgood
Marshall and Ruth Bader Ginsburg were stalwarts of abolition constitutionalism both in practice and on the bench. On the Roberts Court,
Justice Sonia Sotomayor carries on this tradition, though usually in
dissent. Movement judges have made an indelible mark on Supreme
Court jurisprudence. This Section will begin with an analysis of past
movement judges on the Supreme Court before analyzing Justice
Sotomayor’s jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court’s decisions are far-reaching because of their
finality,209 but the decisions of lower federal courts and state courts
are often immediately felt in their communities. Lower court and state
court judges often have much clearer understandings of the impacts
their decisions will have in the communities they serve. To illuminate
examples of movement judges in these roles, this Section will examine
the jurisprudence of Chief Judge Roger Gregory of the Fourth Circuit,
Judge Carlton Reeves of the Southern District of Mississippi, and
Justice Anita Earls of the North Carolina Supreme Court. All three
have brought the perspective of the people to the bench and display
elements of movement judging in their opinions. Notably, only Justice
Earls engaged with social movements in her legal career prior to her
appointment. But all three, like Justice Sotomayor, grew up in
marginalized communities and bring their lived experiences to bear in
their opinions. After the discussion of movement judges on the
209 See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in the result)
(“We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are
final.”).
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Supreme Court, this Section will explore each of these three judges’
jurisprudence in turn.
1. Historical Movement Judges on the Supreme Court
The past Justices whom this Section will examine advanced radical visions of individual rights and equality to varying degrees of success. This Section is not intended as a hagiography—many of these
Justices were deeply flawed, and none of them could be identified as
the ideal of a movement judge. Chief Justice Chase supported dismissing the prosecution of Confederate President Jefferson Davis.210
Justice Brandeis joined the majority in Buck v. Bell.211 Justice
Ginsburg has faced criticism for her failure to hire more than a single
Black law clerk in her career on the bench.212 These failures leave
much to be desired. But we should not discard the entirety of their
accomplishments for these failures. Their historical examples—particularly their triumphant moments—can inform the sorts of jurisprudence that this Article proposes modern movement judges should
seek to advance in their own.
The first movement judges on the Supreme Court were involved
with the original abolitionist movement. John McLean was, for the
bulk of his career on the Court, the lone antislavery voice among his
peers.213 From his time on the Ohio Supreme Court, McLean developed the skill of criticizing unjust laws he was compelled to uphold.214
“Slavery, in McLean’s view, violated all natural law as well as the
210 See Case of Davis, 7 F. Cas. 63, 102 (C.C.D. Va. 1867) (No. 3,621a) (considering
dismissing the indictment for treason against Jefferson Davis); C. Ellen Connally, The Use
of the Fourteenth Amendment by Salmon P. Chase in the Trial of Jefferson Davis, 42
AKRON L. REV. 1165, 1182–85 (2009) (detailing Chase’s extended ex parte maneuvers to
avoid trying Davis for treason).
211 See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (upholding forced sterilization for those with
intellectual disabilities).
212 See Paul Butler, Opinion, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Can Learn Something from Brett
Kavanaugh, WASH. POST (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ruthbader-ginsburg-can-learn-something-from-brett-kavanaugh/2018/10/15/b8974a86-cd7711e8-a360-85875bac0b1f_story.html [https://perma.cc/HB4U-FS6V] (“Ginsburg . . . has
hired only one African American law clerk in her 25 years on the Supreme Court. This is
an improvement from her 13-year tenure on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, when Ginsburg never had any [B]lack clerks.”).
213 See Paul Finkelman, John McLean: Moderate Abolitionist and Supreme Court
Politician, 62 VAND. L. REV. 519, 541 (2009) (“McLean was constrained by fidelity to a
Constitution that protected slavery in significant ways. Throughout his judicial career,
McLean struggled harder than any other federal judge to work around these constraints.”).
214 See State v. Carneal, Ohio Unrep. Cas. (1817), reprinted in OHIO UNREPORTED
JUDICIAL DECISIONS: PRIOR TO 1823, at 133, 135 (Ervin H. Pollack ed., 1952) (“From . . .
our federal compact, and the laws of our national legislature, this Court [is] bound to
respect as property . . . that which is made property by the laws of a sister state, however
repugnant, in our conception, to justice, and contrary to the policy of our own laws.”).
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Ohio Constitution and could only be protected in Ohio to the extent
the federal Constitution required such protection.”215 On the
Supreme Court, McLean consistently dissented from decisions
extending the institution of slavery,216 even going so far as to support
the interests of slave states when the legal reasoning for doing so
would strengthen states’ power to exclude slavery.217 While this sort
of concession to the interests of enslavers might not immediately seem
to fit with the radical approach of a movement judge, it is important to
contextualize the legal conflicts of McLean’s era. Abolitionists were
not only working to end slavery everywhere but were also locked in a
defensive struggle to prevent its advance into states where it was
already ostensibly forbidden.218
Later, prominent abolitionist Salmon P. Chase would become
Chief Justice as the Reconstruction project began.219 While in private
practice, Chase advocated for radical abolitionist positions, going so
far as to challenge Ohio’s evidentiary bar to the testimony of Black
witnesses.220 Chase’s antislavery advocacy was even more pronounced
in his political career.221 On the Court, Chase provided critical support

215

Finkelman, supra note 213, at 543.
See, e.g., Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 671–73 (1842) (McLean, J.,
dissenting) (supporting Pennsylvania’s right to prohibit “the forcible abduction of persons
of colour”); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 531 (1857) (McLean, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that free status and domicile in a state sufficed to make the plaintiff a
citizen with access to federal courts).
217 See Finkelman, supra note 213, at 553–54 (noting how McLean rejected the
constitutional avoidance of the majority to address northern states’ rights to exclude
slavery).
218 See Paul Finkelman, When International Law Was a Domestic Problem, 44 VAL. U.
L. REV. 779, 790–97 (2010) (discussing the heated disputes in Antebellum constitutional
law over how conflicts of laws regarding the free or enslaved status of Black people
traveling between states should be resolved—disputes often summarily resolved by a
presumption that all Black people were enslaved).
219 See Randy E. Barnett, From Antislavery Lawyer to Chief Justice: The Remarkable
but Forgotten Career of Salmon P. Chase, 63 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 653, 675–76 (2013)
(describing the circumstances surrounding Chase’s nomination as Chief Justice in late
1864).
220 See Matthew A. Axtell, What Is Still “Radical” in the Antislavery Legal Practice of
Salmon P. Chase?, 11 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 269, 271 (2014) (“Flouting Ohio
rules restricting testimony from people of color in open court, [Chase] challenged the judge
to treat Clarke like the equivalent of a white man, to hear Clarke’s story directly from his
client’s lips.”).
221 See ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 73 (1995) (“Chase developed an
interpretation of American history which convinced thousands of northerners that antislavery was the intended policy of the founders of the nation, and was fully compatible
with the Constitution.”).
216
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to the Reconstruction project,222 maintaining a strongly abolitionist
vision of the Constitution and the power of the Reconstruction
Amendments.223 Chase consistently opposed the Johnsonian interpretation of the Reconstruction Amendments. While riding circuit, he
ruled that forced apprenticeship contracts violated the Thirteenth
Amendment, which guaranteed that even a juvenile Black woman had
the rights of a citizen.224 Unfortunately, failing health prevented
Chase from authoring dissents in two major cases interpreting the
Reconstruction Amendments near the end of his life—the SlaughterHouse Cases 225 and Bradwell v. Illinois.226 Bradwell in particular
deserves attention, as Chase alone stood willing to interpret the
Fourteenth Amendment to protect individuals from discrimination
not merely on grounds of race but also on those of gender.227 Like
McLean before him, Justice Chase consistently pursued a jurisprudence affirming the rights of individuals far beyond what his peers on
the Court were willing to support. These abolitionist Justices established the tradition of movement judges relentlessly advancing a more
democratic interpretation of the Constitution, even if only in dissent.
Before becoming a Supreme Court Justice, Louis Brandeis first
devoted much of his practice to advocacy for the common person.228
222 See Barnett, supra note 219, at 677–83 (describing Chase’s major opinions on the
attempts to reinstate slavery under other names and the legal status of the Confederate
state governments).
223 See id. at 694–97 (discussing Chase’s dissent from the Slaughter-House Cases and
belief that the Privileges or Immunities Clause supported the equal civil rights of women).
224 See id. at 677–79 (discussing Chase’s decision to this effect in In re Turner, 24 F. Cas.
337 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247)).
225 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
226 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872); see Barnett, supra note 219, at 696 (“Chase was too
weak and ill from a series of previous st[r]okes to write opinions in either case. Three
weeks after the decisions on Slaughter-House and Bradwell were announced, a final stroke
took his life.”).
227 See Barnett, supra note 219, at 696–97 (noting Chase as the sole dissenter in
Bradwell).
228 See Chistopher A. Bracey, Louis Brandeis and the Race Question, 52 ALA. L. REV.
859, 860–61 (2001) (“Brandeis is considered an icon in American legal culture because we
purport to understand his public-spirited approach to the law as having elevated our
expectations of lawyers and judges and transformed our perceptions of the purpose of law
in civilized society.”); see also Frederick M. Lawrence, The Continuing Vitality of Louis D.
Brandeis’s Free Expression Jurisprudence, 33 TOURO L. REV. 131, 132–33 (2017) (calling
Brandeis the “people’s lawyer”). That said, Brandeis’s relative silence on matters of racial
justice makes him an imperfect candidate for inclusion in a list of movement judges. See
Bracey, supra, at 878–84 (discussing how Brandeis’s lack of advocacy in matters of racial
injustice is conspicuous in light of the actions of his contemporaries); id. at 885 (“Brandeis
was willing to go quite far in the defense of certain rights of the public. Unfortunately, the
liberty and equality interests of African-American citizens were not among those rights.”).
Ultimately, his advocacy and jurisprudence resulted in advances that aided the cause of the
civil rights movement, even if he himself lacked the will or desire to push them to that end.
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He was motivated in large part by his vision that America could
become a freer, fairer democracy.229 Brandeis sought to establish fairness in the relationship between capital and labor and recognized the
necessity of increasing the relative power of labor to reach this end.230
His famous “Brandeis Brief”—one that relied more on scientific and
testimonial information than on pure legal arguments—initiated a
change in the varieties of evidence appellate courts would consider
while winning a significant victory for labor protection laws.231 Along
with his law partner, Samuel D. Warren, Brandeis wrote the seminal
article The Right to Privacy,232 which precipitated the development of
common-law and constitutional privacy protections.233 “He earned the
accolade ‘the People’s Lawyer’ through his advocacy against monopolies, support for workers’ rights, opposition to political corruption,
[and] robust defense of the rights to privacy and freedom of expression . . . .”234 Brandeis’s commitment to advocating for the public good
Jeffrey Rosen, Revisiting The Tenure of Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, The ‘Jewish
Jefferson,’ NPR (June 7, 2016), https://www.npr.org/2016/06/07/481076322/revisiting-thetenure-of-supreme-court-justice-louis-brandeis-the-jewish-jeffers [https://perma.cc/K4W4QDZT] (“Brandeis has a blind spot. And that is race. He was personally courteous to
African-Americans, but he was not a crusader for racial equality in the way he was, or at
least became, for gender equality, for example.”); Larry M. Roth, The Many Lives of Louis
Brandeis: Progressive-Reformer. Supreme Court Justice. Avowed Zionist. And a Racist?, 34
S.U. L. REV. 123, 165 (2009) (comparing the research Brandeis aided the NAACP in to
challenge segregation in transportation—which he set aside to accept his nomination to the
Supreme Court—with the later arguments against segregation in Brown).
229 See Jonathan Sallet, Louis Brandeis: A Man for This Season, 16 COLO. TECH. L.J.
365, 373 (2018) (exploring Brandeis’s philosophy “that America was built on a unique set
of principles, that its tools of democratic governance formed the fulcrum on which those
principles could be vindicated and extended, and that the work of seeking democratic and
economic progress would never be done”).
230 See L.S. Zacharias, Repaving the Brandeis Way: The Decline of Developmental
Property, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 596, 640–41 (1988) (discussing Brandeis’s optimism that a
mutually beneficial circumstance could be reached in labor relations and his realization
that the process would require long struggle and government intervention to redistribute
bargaining power).
231 See Clyde Spillenger, Revenge of the Triple Negative: A Note on the Brandeis Brief in
Muller v. Oregon, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 5, 6 (2005) (“Certainly the ‘Brandeis brief’ has
been, in many major cases, an important weapon in the arsenal of appellate litigators, and
its immediate impact on the movement for protective labor legislation was considerable.”).
232 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
233 See Randall P. Bezanson, The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy, News, and Social
Change, 1890-1990, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 1133, 1135 (1992) (“Warren and Brandeis made
their important contribution by giving legal definition to this boundary between personal
and public space—between occasions when personal information should be the business of
others and occasions when it should be no one else’s affair.”).
234 Russell G. Pearce, Adam B. Winer & Emily Jenab, A Challenge to Bleached Out
Professional Identity: How Jewish Was Justice Louis D. Brandeis?, 33 TOURO L. REV. 335,
335 (2017).
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was deeply held and became foundational to the modern view of such
work as an obligation on all lawyers.235
On the bench, Brandeis advanced many of the same causes he
advocated as an attorney. He laid the foundations of an expansion of
the freedom of speech236 and a right of privacy.237 Brandeis consistently worked against the application of substantive due process as a
bludgeon against legislative protection of workers.238 Ultimately, he
formed part of the majority to abrogate Lochner in West Coast Hotel
v. Parrish.239 Justice Brandeis’s movement judging, while often in concurrences and dissents, was vindicated in many cases through its adoption by later majorities.240 He consistently applied democracy- and
rights-affirming jurisprudence, in solidarity with popular movements
and with a clear vision for reshaping constitutional interpretation.241
235 See Lawrence, supra note 228, at 132–33 (“Brandeis provided representation gratis
for those who could not afford his legal services, and for cases that he thought raised
significant public issues, anticipating and championing what would become a well-accepted
obligation for an attorney to dedicate some proportion of her or his time to pro bono
work.”).
236 See Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Curious Concurrence: Justice
Brandeis’s Vote in Whitney v. California, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 333, 334 (“[Brandeis’s
concurrence in Whitney] has been celebrated as one of the most conceptually influential
and rhetorically powerful justifications for First Amendment liberties.”).
237 See Neil M. Richards, The Puzzle of Brandeis, Privacy, and Speech, 63 VAND. L.
REV. 1295, 1338 (2010) (discussing Brandeis’s view that privacy is “not primarily about
maintaining the status of elites, but preserving the dignity and autonomy of a selfgoverning citizenry”).
238 See Helen Garfield, Privacy, Abortion, and Judicial Review: Haunted by the Ghost of
Lochner, 61 WASH. L. REV. 293, 345 (1986) (contrasting Brandeis’s support for substantive
due process in human rights contexts with his opposition to its application to invalidate
economic regulation).
239 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (overruling Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) and
thus abrogating Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
240 See Joel K. Goldstein & Charles A. Miller, Brandeis: The Legacy of a Justice, 100
MARQ. L. REV. 461, 462 (2016) (“[Brandeis’s] concurrences and dissents, which the Court
later used to mold new and enduring doctrine, left a wider imprint.”).
241 Brandeis’s free speech dissents, often in cases involving radical political movements,
advanced a lonely constitutional vision—that the right to participate in debates regarding
the governance of the United States was so fundamental as to already have been inviolable
prior to the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Lawrence, supra note 228, at
133–38 (exploring Brandeis’s structuralist approach to free speech in his jurisprudence).
While he did not advocate extensively for the rights of women and people of color before
his appointment to the bench, he was open to the constitutional interpretations of those
who did. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2356 (2002) (“While
neither Holmes nor Brandeis had the kind of egalitarian constitutional vision the early
suffragists or anti-apartheid thinkers had, they were open to updating the Constitution to
protect women and people of color from harm.”). This history on race and gender fits well
with his economic jurisprudence, which reveals that the popular movement he most clearly
associated with was not the labor movement or an identity-based social movement, but the
Progressive movement. See Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeis as
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More recently, Justices Thurgood Marshall and Ruth Bader
Ginsburg have served as examples of the preferred type of Justice for
liberals and activists.242 And rightly so. Both fundamentally changed
and accelerated civil rights prior to their appointments.243 Justice
Marshall famously won Brown v. Board of Education,244 successfully
arguing that school segregation was a violation of individual rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment.245 Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued
six gender discrimination cases before the Supreme Court, winning
five of them.246 On the bench, their practice of fighting for equality
and justice only continued. Both Justices developed reputations as
passionate advocates for civil rights and activism generally.247 Both
authored opinions that challenged the ideology of the Court and
remembered the law’s interaction with people.248
People’s Lawyer, 105 YALE L.J. 1445, 1462 (1996) (“Brandeis’s rhetoric of both ‘industrial
democracy’ and ‘social efficiency’ reflected the dual character of Progressive reform, a
vision that was at once humanitarian and organizational, serving the ideals of both social
justice and social control, both uplift and efficiency.”).
242 See generally Stephen L. Carter, What Thurgood Marshall Taught Me, N.Y. TIMES
MAG. (July 15, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/14/magazine/thurgood-marshallstories.html?referringSource=articleShare [https://perma.cc/NQ3Q-82D7]; Robert Cohen
& Laura J. Dull, Teaching About the Feminist Rights Revolution: Ruth Bader Ginsburg as
“The Thurgood Marshall of Women’s Rights,” ORG. AM. HISTORIANS, https://
www.oah.org/tah/issues/2017/november/teaching-about-the-feminist-rights-revolutionruth-bader-ginsburg-as-the-thurgood-marshall-of-womens-rights [https://perma.cc/DN4L5CF5]; Kimberly Strawbridge Robinson & Jordan S. Rubin, Ginsburg’s Career,
Replacement Parallel Thurgood Marshall’s, BLOOMBERG L. (Sept. 28, 2020), https://
news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/ginsburgs-career-replacement-parallel-thurgoodmarshalls [https://perma.cc/MUZ3-3DPJ].
243 Both also benefited in their advocacy from the strategic work of Pauli Murray. See
Kathryn Schulz, The Many Lives of Pauli Murray, NEW YORKER (Apr. 10, 2017), https://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/04/17/the-many-lives-of-pauli-murray [https://
perma.cc/9KMT-RDMZ] (noting the influence of Murray’s writing on both Marshall’s
advocacy to overturn Plessy and Ginsburg’s advocacy to include sex within the protections
of the Equal Protection Clause).
244 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
245 See Sherrilyn Ifill, How Thurgood Marshall Paved the Road to ‘Brown v. Board of
Education,’ SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Mar. 10, 2021), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/
how-thurgood-marshall-paved-road-brown-v-board-education-180977197 [https://
perma.cc/X7Y6-JT4J].
246 Anthony D. Romero, In Memory of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (1933-2020),
ACLU (Sept. 19, 2020), https://www.aclu.org/news/civil-liberties/in-memory-of-justiceruth-bader-ginsburg-1933-2020 [https://perma.cc/N4HQ-34UB] (“While at the ACLU,
Ginsburg played a role in 34 Supreme Court cases, and won five of the six cases she argued
before the court . . . .”).
247 See supra notes 242–46 and accompanying text.
248 See generally Thurgood Marshall, O YEZ , https://www.oyez.org/justices/
thurgood_marshall [https://perma.cc/85SQ-EDPX]; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, OYEZ, https://
www.oyez.org/justices/ruth_bader_ginsburg [https://perma.cc/3XT2-NZKL].
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2. Justice Sonia Sotomayor: The Truth Teller of the Supreme Court
On today’s Court, Justice Sotomayor best illustrates the constitutional vision and solidarity of a movement judge.249 Like Justices
Marshall and Ginsburg, Justice Sotomayor uses her personal experiences of discrimination to inform her opinions.250 Like Justices
Marshall and Ginsburg, she is mindful of discrimination beyond her
lived experiences. “Her voice, in all its forms, has become the liberal
conscience on a conservative court, one that speaks out in defense of
minorities, immigrants, criminal defendants and death row
inmates.”251 An examination of some of her recent opinions will
demonstrate her contributions as a movement judge.
The Roberts Court continued its constriction of the Fourth
Amendment in Utah v. Strieff.252 The Court granted certiorari to discuss how the attenuation doctrine253—allowing the unconstitutionality
of a practice to be excused when it is a sufficiently remote cause from
the evidence obtained by it—applies when an unconstitutional deten249 See Greenhouse, supra note 16; Richard Wolf, ‘The People’s Justice’: After Decade
on Supreme Court, Sonia Sotomayor is Most Outspoken on Bench and off, USA TODAY
(Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/08/08/justice-soniasotomayor-supreme-court-liberal-hispanic-decade-bench/1882245001 [https://perma.cc/
H5HT-V3JZ]; Jazmine Ulloa, Sonia Sotomayor is the Lone Voice on Systemic Racism on
the Most Conservative Supreme Court in Decades, BOS. GLOBE (June 28, 2020), https://
www.bostonglobe.com/2020/06/28/nation/her-daca-dissent-sonia-sotomayor-shows-shesvoice-one-systemic-racism-most-conservative-supreme-court-decades [https://perma.cc/
QWC4-7SCB] (describing how Justice Sotomayor’s acknowledgement of the history and
continued presence of racial animus and the individual persons behind each case informs
her jurisprudence); Adam Liptak, In Dissents, Sonia Sotomayor Takes On the Criminal
Justice System, N.Y. TIMES: SIDEBAR (July 4, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/05/
us/politics/in-dissents-sonia-sotomayor-takes-on-the-criminal-justice-system.html [https://
perma.cc/SS77-SKB6] (describing how Justice Sotomayor’s understanding of the disparate
impact of heightened police scrutiny and of the real-world experiences of communities of
color affects her criminal procedure jurisprudence).
250 See generally Sara Kettler, How Sonia Sotomayor Overcame Adversity to Become the
United States’ First Hispanic and Latina Justice, BIOGRAPHY (Oct. 1, 2020), https://
www.biography.com/news/sonia-sotomayor-overcame-adversity-supreme-court-justice
[https://perma.cc/LD2R-VFQF] (detailing how Justice Sotomayor’s experience with Type 1
diabetes and discrimination at Princeton and Yale Law School instilled in her, at a young
age, a hardy optimism and headstrong perseverance).
251 Wolf, supra note 249.
252 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2064 (2016) (holding that the evidence the officer seized as a part of
his search incident to arrest was admissible “because his discovery of the arrest warrant
attenuated the connection between the unlawful stop and the evidence seized from [the
defendant] incident to arrest”).
253 See id. at 2061 (“Evidence is admissible when the connection between
unconstitutional policy conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by
some intervening circumstance, so that ‘the interest protected by the constitutional
guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence
obtained.’” (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593 (2006))).
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tion leads to the discovery of a valid arrest warrant.254 Ultimately, the
Court held, as encapsulated in Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, “that the
discovery of a warrant for an unpaid parking ticket will forgive a
police officer’s violation of your Fourth Amendment rights.”255 In a
mere six pages, Justice Thomas cited the appropriate cases, walked
through a three-factor test, and dusted his hands of yet another
criminalized person—dismissing the glaringly unconstitutional detention as an “isolated” incident.256 Justice Sotomayor vehemently disagreed, engaging with painful realities “in a voice that speaks not only
to the legally trained, but also to the ordinary people who are most
impacted by the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence”257:
[M]any innocent people are subjected to the humiliations of these
unconstitutional searches. The white defendant in this case shows
that anyone’s dignity can be violated in this manner. But it is no
secret that people of color are disproportionate victims of this type
of scrutiny. For generations, [B]lack and [B]rown parents have
given their children “the talk”—instructing them never to run down
the street; always keep your hands where they can be seen; do not
even think of talking back to a stranger—all out of fear of how an
officer with a gun will react to them. . . .
We must not pretend that the countless people who are routinely targeted by police are “isolated.” They are the canaries in the
coal mine whose deaths, civil and literal, warn us that no one can
breathe in this atmosphere. They are the ones who recognize that
unlawful police stops corrode all our civil liberties and threaten all
our lives. Until their voices matter too, our justice system will
continue to be anything but.258

Instead of sterilizing the law, Justice Sotomayor engaged with the present-day realities of the common person that are frequently forgotten
or ignored in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. Sotomayor’s
254 A Utah police officer staked out a local residence after receiving an anonymous tip
claiming ongoing drug activity. Id. at 2059. After a week, the officer followed a man
leaving the residence, unlawfully detained him in a parking lot, and asked for his
identification. Id. at 2060. He then communicated this information to a police dispatcher,
who informed the officer that the man had an outstanding arrest warrant for a traffic
violation. Id. The officer arrested and searched him, finding drug paraphernalia. Id.
255 Id. at 2064 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
256 See id. at 2063 (majority opinion) (“Moreover, there is no indication that this
unlawful stop was part of any systemic or recurrent police misconduct. To the contrary, all
the evidence suggests that the stop was an isolated instance of negligence that occurred in
connection with a bona fide investigation of a suspected drug house.”).
257 Ronald Tyler, Utah v. Strieff: A Bad Decision on Policing with a Gripping Dissent by
Justice Sotomayor, STAN. L. SCH. BLOGS (July 5, 2016), https://law.stanford.edu/2016/07/05/
utah-v-strieff-a-bad-decision-on-policing-with-a-gripping-dissent-by-justice-sotomayor
[https://perma.cc/PGF4-RMDL].
258 Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2070–71 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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approach is distinct and a critical tenet of what makes a movement
judge.259
Beyond addressing present realities, Justice Sotomayor also refuses to accept a glossy rendition of the past. In Terry v. United
States,260 the Court considered whether crack offenders who do not
trigger a statutory mandatory minimum qualify for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act of 2018.261 Justice Thomas, writing for
the majority, answered with a resounding no.262 While all nine agreed
with the legal analysis, only Justice Sotomayor addressed Justice
Thomas’s “unnecessary, incomplete, and sanitized” history of the 100to-1 crack cocaine ratio.263 In her words, “[m]ost egregiously, the
Court barely references the ratio’s real-world impact and disregards
the fact that, ‘as the racial effects of mandatory minimums and the
crack/cocaine disparity became apparent, the [Congressional Black
Caucus] came together in unanimous and increasingly vocal opposition to the law.’”264 As she did in Strieff, Sotomayor considered the
real-world impact of the law within her concurrence. Given the
Court’s current makeup, Justice Sotomayor’s espousal of expansive,
humanistic interpretations of the law seems fated to remain outside
the majority.265
259 Sotomayor dissented in a Supreme Court denial of certiorari for a case involving a
law that allows Alabama judges to decide to impose the death penalty on a convicted
individual, even in the face of a jury decision not to impose death. There, Sotomayor
emphasized that this practice “casts a cloud of illegitimacy over the criminal justice system”
by “permitting a single trial judge’s view to displace that of a jury representing a crosssection of the community.” Woodward v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 1045, 1050–51 (2013)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (order denying peitition for writ of certiorari). Assigning
particular importance to the role of the jury in representing the will of citizens, Sotomayor
cited self-interested political gain as a motivating factor for judges who override the will of
juries. See id. at 1050 (“What could explain Alabama judges’ distinctive proclivity for
imposing death sentences in cases where a jury has already rejected that penalty? . . .
Alabama judges, who are elected in partisan proceedings, appear to have succumbed to
electoral pressures.”).
260 141 S. Ct. 1858 (2021).
261 Id. at 1860.
262 Id.
263 Id. at 1864 n.1 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment);
see also Greenhouse, supra note 16 (“While agreeing with Justice Thomas’s analysis and
bottom line, Justice Sotomayor refused to sign on to his version of the history of the crackpowder disparity, calling his account ‘unnecessary, incomplete, and sanitized.’”).
264 Terry, 141 S. Ct. at 1864 n.1 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (emphasis added).
265 See Ariane de Vogue, Major 6-3 Rulings Foreshadow a Sharper Supreme Court Right
Turn, CNN (July 1, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/07/01/politics/supreme-court-6-3conservative-liberal/index.html [https://perma.cc/353K-T9HU] (“But Republicans and
conservatives are finally getting the decisions they pined for as former President Donald
Trump changed the face of the courts and liberals are preparing for a bloodbath.”).
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At times, conservative Justices reach positive outcomes via their
apathetic legal method.266 When this happens, Justice Sotomayor joins
in concurrence. In Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the
University of California,267 the Court considered whether the
Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) recission of Deferred
Action for Children Arrivals (DACA) was unlawful. DACA was created to allow “certain unauthorized aliens who entered the United
States as children to apply for a two-year forbearance of removal . . .
[with eligibility] for work authorization and various federal benefits.”268 Most recipients—known as “Dreamers”269—are born in Latin
America.270 DACA clashed with then-President Trump’s “overtly”
racist, “anti-Mexican platform.”271 Chief Justice Roberts, writing for
the majority, held that the recission of the DACA program was arbitrary and capricious, but dismissed the respondents’ arguments
regarding the racial animus behind the recission as “unilluminating,”
“remote in time,” and “made in unrelated contexts.”272 Justice
Sotomayor disagreed; citing Trump’s own statements,273 she rejected
the notion that anti-Brown racism and xenophobia did not motivate
the decision to end the program.274 Once again, she served as a movement judge in her lonely recognition and criticism of racial and ethnic
discrimination.

266 See, e.g., Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020) (holding that an
employer violates Title VII, which makes it unlawful to discriminate against an individual
“because of” the individual’s sex, by firing an individual for being homosexual or being a
transgender person).
267 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020).
268 Id. at 1901.
269 See What Is DACA and Who Are the DREAMers?, ADL, https://www.adl.org/
education/resources/tools-and-strategies/table-talk/what-is-daca-and-who-are-thedreamers [https://perma.cc/X8JA-9SS3] (“The young people impacted by DACA and the
DREAM Act are often referred to as ‘Dreamers.’ . . . [They] are young people who have
grown up as Americans, identify as Americans, and may speak only English and have no
memory of or connection with the country where they were born.”).
270 Gustavo López & Jens Manuel Krogstad, Key Facts About Unauthorized Immigrants
Enrolled in DACA, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2017/09/25/key-facts-about-unauthorized-immigrants-enrolled-in-daca [https://
perma.cc/SSE2-KG63].
271 See Ulloa, supra note 249.
272 Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1915–16.
273 See id. at 1917 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part,
and dissenting in part) (“The Batalla Vidal complaints catalog then-candidate Trump’s
declarations that Mexican immigrants are ‘people that have lots of problems,’ ‘the bad
ones,’ and ‘criminals, drug dealers, and rapists.’”).
274 Id.; see also Ulloa, supra note 249.
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3. Fourth Circuit Chief Judge Gregory’s Fourth Amendment
Jurisprudence Recognizes the Impact His Opinions Have on
Marginalized Communities
Beyond the national spotlight on the Supreme Court, several
lower federal court judges and state judges exemplify the qualities of a
movement judge. In Judge Gregory’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the perspectives of marginalized communities and the experience of the defendant are predominant. He decisively points out the
racial undertones of the question before the court.275 Though the
Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is infamously colorblind, Judge Gregory’s jurisprudence recognizes the racial aspect of
the Fourth Circuit’s cases and deploys the colorblind Supreme Court
precedent to protect the rights of minorities.276 His opinions in three
cases—United States v. Black,277 United States v. Curry,278 and
Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v. Baltimore Police Department 279 —
provide clear examples.
In Black, police used the previous arrest of one man and the legal
possession of a firearm by another to justify the frisk of five other
men.280 A search of one of those men revealed an illegally concealed
weapon, for which he was arrested.281 Judge Gregory’s majority
opinion held that the stop violated Mr. Black’s Fourth Amendment
rights.282 But Judge Gregory did more than merely uphold Mr. Black’s
constitutional rights. He rigorously scrutinized the government’s arguments, rejected the government’s framing of the facts, and placed the
incident in its proper racial and factual context.283 He rejected the
government’s contention that another man’s idling at a gas station or
the arrest record of one of his compatriots had any bearing on
whether Mr. Black was engaging in suspicious conduct.284 He also
275 See, e.g., United States v. Curry, 965 F.3d 313, 332 (4th Cir. 2020) (Gregory, C.J.,
concurring) (“There’s a long history of [B]lack and [B]rown communities feeling unsafe in
police presence.”).
276 See Daniel Harawa & Brandon Hasbrouck, Antiracism in Action, 78 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1027, 1032 (2021).
277 707 F.3d 531 (4th Cir. 2013).
278 965 F.3d 313 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc).
279 2 F.4th 330 (4th Cir. 2021) (en banc).
280 See Black, 707 F.3d at 534–36.
281 See id.
282 See id. at 539 (concluding that the facts failed “to support the conclusion that [the
officer] had reasonable suspicion to detain Black”).
283 See id. at 537–42; id. at 539 (“[T]he Government attempts to meet its Terry burden
by patching together a set of innocent, suspicion-free facts, which cannot rationally be
relied on to establish reasonable suspicion.”).
284 See id. at 539–40 (stating that the officer’s “suspicion that a lone driver at a gas pump
who he did not observe drive into the gas station is engaged in drug trafficking borders on
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rejected the officers’ “Rule of Two”—the notion that finding one gun
meant another was present—stating that it would be an “abdicat[ion]”
of his judicial duty to accept that “arbitrary and boundless rule . . . [as]
a basis for reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.”285
Turning to the racial dimensions of the case, Judge Gregory
refused to “give the judicial imprimatur” to a “dichotomy in the intrusion of constitutional protections.”286 He admonished that North
Carolina’s laws “apply uniformly and without exception” throughout
the entire state.287 That meant that everyone in North Carolina was
allowed to carry a gun without raising suspicion—including Black
people.288 Rejecting the contention that Mr. Black volunteering his ID
had been suspiciously “overly cooperative,” he recognized that “this
type of . . . justification for reasonable suspicion . . . places a defendant
in a worse position than if he had simply refused to cooperate altogether.”289 Finally, he recognized that such a rule would require Black
and Brown people to walk a tightrope between cooperation and disdain whenever they interact with police.290 By refusing to rubberstamp the government’s conduct and highlighting the racial import of
the case, Judge Gregory’s opinion in Black reads the Fourth
Amendment in solidarity with marginalized communities.
His concurring opinion in Curry does the same by acknowledging
the lived experience of the often-strained relationship between Black
and Brown people and the police. In Curry, the Fourth Circuit, sitting
en banc, held that officers could not base reasonable suspicion on predictive policing data291 which identifies the “most likely locations, perpetrators, and victims of future crime.”292 Judge J. Harvey Wilkinson
dissented, expressing his view that there are “two Americas”293: the
absurd” and that another man’s arrest history “cannot be a logical basis for a reasonable,
particularized suspicion as to Black”).
285 Id. at 540–41.
286 Id. at 540.
287 Id.
288 See id. (“[W]here a state permits individuals to openly carry firearms, the exercise of
this right, without more, cannot justify an investigatory detention.”).
289 Id. at 541.
290 See id. (“If police officers can justify unreasonable seizures on a citizen’s
acquiescence, individuals would have no Fourth Amendment protections unless they
interact with officers with the perfect amount of graceful disdain.”).
291 See United States v. Curry, 965 F.3d 313, 325–26 (4th Cir. 2020) (requiring
individualized suspicion for a Terry stop); id. at 331 (Gregory, C.J., concurring) (discussing
“predictive policing”).
292 Margo McGehee, Predictive Policing Technology: Fourth Amendment and Public
Policy Concerns, U. CIN. L. REV. (Feb. 17, 2021), https://uclawreview.org/2021/02/17/
predictive-policing-technology-fourth-amendment-and-public-policy-concerns [https://
perma.cc/GP3Q-BVML].
293 Curry, 965 F.3d at 346 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
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safe, affluent one where law enforcement can move without excessive
judicial barriers, and the America of the “least fortunate,” where
police are too restrained in their jobs to protect people from crime.294
In a separate concurrence, Judge Gregory responded to Judge
Wilkinson’s paternalistic portrayal of historically underserved and
over-policed communities. He agreed that there are two Americas but
explained that the two are divided along racial lines.295 He contrasted
Judge Wilkinson’s fear of under-policing with the already existing
dangers of over-policing and discussed at length the “long history of
[B]lack and [B]rown communities feeling unsafe in police presence.”296 He acknowledged that Black and Brown people feel insecure because police perceive them as dangerous “even when they are
in their living rooms eating ice cream, asleep in their beds, playing in
the park, standing in the pulpit of their church, birdwatching, exercising in public, or walking home from a trip to the store to purchase a
bag of Skittles . . . .”297 In arguing for the protection of all people’s
Fourth Amendment rights, Judge Gregory’s concurrence advances an
abolitionist constitutionalist interpretation.
In Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle, Judge Gregory wrote the
majority opinion as well as a concurrence to his own opinion.298 The
majority opinion granted a preliminary injunction to enjoin
Baltimore’s aerial surveillance program, which, it held, likely violates
the Fourth Amendment.299 Judge Gregory’s movement judging is
illustrated in his concurrence. As in Curry, the concurrence responds
to Judge Wilkinson’s dissent, though this time Judge Wilkinson’s dissent is the principal one.300 At the outset, Judge Gregory rejects the
dissent’s premise that “[p]olicing ameliorates violence, and restraining
police authority exacerbates it.”301 He also announced his skepticism
as to the dissent’s contention that this premise “genuinely respects
and represents the humanity, dignity, and lived experience of those
the dissent ventures to speak for,”302 namely Baltimore’s “poor Black
and [B]rown communities” and “the most vulnerable among us.”303
He disparaged the dissent for disregarding “the systems, relationships,
294

See id.
See id. at 331–32 (Gregory, C.J., concurring).
296 Id. at 332.
297 Id.
298 Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v. Balt. Police Dep’t, 2 F.4th 330, 333 (4th Cir. 2021)
(en banc).
299 See id. at 333.
300 Id. at 348–51 (Gregory, C.J., concurring).
301 Id. at 348.
302 Id.
303 Id. at 365 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
295
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and foundational problems that have perpetuated Baltimore’s epidemic of violence,” all of which grew out of segregation that “divided
the city largely along the lines of color.”304 More clearly than even in
Black and Curry, Judge Gregory draws attention to the racial context
of the case.305 Finally, he refuses to accept “that some neighborhoods
in Baltimore are hopeless absent this aerial surveillance” and proclaimed that “Baltimoreans need not sacrifice their constitutional
rights to obtain equal government protection.”306
Judge Gregory’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence exemplifies
the solidarity with social movements and centering of the experiences
of marginalized communities charcteristic of movement judging.
Judges can only erode rights-restrictive, democracy-stifling precedent
by pointing out its consequences in case after case. Whether in the
majority or in the dissent, movement judges must do this.
4. Judge Reeves’s Opinion in Jamison v. McClendon Calls on the
Supreme Court to Acknowledge the Human Cost of Its
Qualified Immunity Doctrine
When Judge Reeves’s opinion in Jamison v. McClendon 307 was
published, it sparked national headlines.308 Not because the outcome
was a break from precedent or because the facts were particularly
egregious—though they were distressing—but because Judge Reeves
opened the opinion with a list of nineteen Black people who had died
at the hands of police and ended with a blistering critique of qualified
immunity.309 Judge Reeves concluded at the outset that Supreme
Court precedent required him to grant qualified immunity to the
officer and dismiss the suit.310 But he used the opinion, published in
304

Id. at 348–49 (Gregory, C.J., concurring).
See id. at 349 (“Segregation effectively plundered Baltimore’s Black
neighborhoods—transferring wealth, public resources, and investment to their white
counterparts—and the consequences persist today.”).
306 Id. at 350.
307 476 F. Supp. 3d 386 (S.D. Miss. 2020).
308 See, e.g., Justin Jouvenal, Judge’s Blistering Opinion Says Courts Have Placed Police
Beyond Accountability, WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
crime-law/2020/08/06/judges-blistering-opinion-says-courts-have-placed-police-beyondaccountability [https://perma.cc/GEH2-BJJG] (“In an opinion released Monday, Reeves
wrote that the case was a miscarriage of justice, but that his hands were tied by a onceobscure legal doctrine that is coming under increasing fire as the nation reckons with how
to hold police responsible for misdeeds: qualified immunity.”).
309 See Jamison, 476 F. Supp. 3d at 390–91 (listing the nonviolent activities that led to
police killing nineteen different Black people).
310 See id. at 392 (“This Court is required to apply the law as stated by the Supreme
Court. Under that law, the officer who transformed a short traffic stop into an almost twohour, life-altering ordeal is entitled to qualified immunity. The officer’s motion seeking as
much is therefore granted.”).
305
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the midst of protests against police violence following the death of
George Floyd, as a vehicle to give voice to the people’s increasing
calls to end qualified immunity.311 “[L]et us not be fooled by legal
jargon,” he wrote, “Immunity is not exoneration. And the harm in this
case to one man sheds light on the harm done to the nation by this
manufactured doctrine. As the Fourth Circuit concluded [in another
case], ‘This has to stop.’”312
Judge Reeves acknowledged police officers’ and the government’s interest in a robust qualified immunity doctrine, but argued
that the doctrine had gone too far, and now serves to shield police
officers from accountability for the killing and abuse of innocent civilians.313 He provided a detailed account of the “‘origins’ of the relevant law,”314 pointing out the racist roots of the qualified immunity
doctrine,315 along with poignant examples of the injustices it has
wrought.316 Judge Reeves concluded by comparing qualified immunity
to “the mistaken doctrine of ‘separate but equal,’” and called on the
Supreme Court to overrule its qualified immunity jurisprudence, just
311 See Majority of Public Favors Giving Civilians the Power to Sue Police Officers for
Misconduct, PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 9, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2020/
07/09/majority-of-public-favors-giving-civilians-the-power-to-sue-police-officers-formisconduct [https://perma.cc/KT84-HT8R] (finding that sixty-six percent of the public
supports abolishing qualified immunity).
312 Jamison, 476 F. Supp. 3d at 392. The Fourth Circuit case that Judge Reeves quotes,
Estate of Jones v. City of Martinsburg, 961 F.3d 661 (4th Cir. 2020), was decided by a panel
that included Judge Gregory. Though Judge Gregory did not write the opinion, he joined it
in full. See id. at 663.
313 See Jamison, 476 F. Supp. 3d at 392 (“Tragically, thousands have died at the hands of
law enforcement over the years, and the death toll continues to rise. Countless more have
suffered from other forms of abuse and misconduct by police. Qualified immunity has
served as a shield for these officers, protecting them from accountability.”).
314 Id. at 396.
315 See id. at 402–03 (explaining that qualified immunity was first granted to officers
who had arrested fifteen clergymen protesting “segregated facilities at an interstate bus
terminal in Jackson, Mississippi, in 1961”).
316 See id. at 407 (including the case of Trent Taylor who was forced to spend “a total of
six days in feces-covered cells[,] . . . ‘was not allowed clothing, and [was] forced to endure
the cold temperatures with nothing but a suicide blanket’”). The Supreme Court vacated
the Fifth Circuit’s grant of qualified immunity without hearing argument. See Taylor v.
Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 53 (2020) (per curiam) (“Confronted with the particularly egregious
facts of this case, any reasonable officer should have realized that Taylor’s conditions of
confinement offended the Constitution.”). The reversal, combined with a second shadow
docket reversal of a Fifth Circuit qualified immunity case, this time in McCoy v. Alamu,
141 S. Ct. 1364 (2021) (mem.), prompted speculation that the Supreme Court was starting
to back-pedal its qualified immunity doctrine. See Anya Bidwell & Patrick Jaicomo, Lower
Courts Take Notice: The Supreme Court Is Rethinking Qualified Immunity, USA TODAY
(Mar. 2, 2021), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2021/03/02/supreme-court-mightrethinking-qualified-immunity-column/4576549001 [https://perma.cc/XNL9-CCDC]. Judge
Reeves also pointed out the injustice of the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in McCoy. See Jamison,
476 F. Supp. 3d at 406.
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as it had overruled “separate but equal” in Brown v. Board of
Education.317 The opinion is a remarkable example of how movement
judges can use their opinions to express solidarity with social movements, even if precedent mandates a ruling for the other side.
5. Justice Anita Earls’s Concurrence Speaks Truth to Power After
the North Carolina Supreme Court Dodges the Race
Question at the Heart of State v. Copley
Movement judges do not ignore difficult, politically-charged
questions when they are squarely presented. In State v. Copley,318 a
white man was charged with first-degree murder for shooting Kourey
Thomas, a Black man.319 The defense argued that the defendant had
acted in response to a reasonable fear and shot Mr. Thomas in selfdefense.320 The prosecutor asked the jury to consider whether it
believed that the defendant would have shot Mr. Thomas if Mr.
Thomas had been white.321 If not, he argued, the defendant’s fear was
not reasonable; it was “just hatred.”322 On review, the North Carolina
Supreme Court dodged the question of whether the prosecutor’s
remarks were improper, but upheld the guilty verdict because the
defendant was not prejudiced by the comments, “given the context of
the challenged argument, and the extensive evidence of defendant’s
guilt.”323
Justice Anita Earls addressed the propriety of the statements
head on. In her concurrence, she chastised the majority for assuming
the statements were improper “when the propriety of the statement is
the very heart of what matters to the administration of criminal justice
and the jurisprudence of this State.”324 She concluded that the record
suggested “that jurors potentially might have been swayed by their
own conscious or unconscious racial biases instead of the evidence in
the case.”325 Given those circumstances, “the prosecutor properly
argued that it would not be reasonable for defendant to fear Kourey
Thomas, the victim in the case, if that fear was based on the fact that
317 Jamison, 476 F. Supp. 3d at 423 (“[T]he status quo is extraordinary and
unsustainable. Just as the Supreme Court swept away the mistaken doctrine of ‘separate
but equal,’ so too should it eliminate the doctrine of qualified immunity.” (citing Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954))).
318 839 S.E.2d 726 (N.C. 2020).
319 Id. at 727–28.
320 Id. at 728.
321 Id.
322 Id.
323 Id. at 731.
324 Id. at 731–32 (Earls, J., concurring).
325 Id. at 732.
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Kourey Thomas was [B]lack.”326 Justice Earls explained when a prosecutor’s reference to race is permissible and when it is not, and provided a “two-part standard” based on prior precedent “for evaluating
the propriety of a prosecutor’s statements referencing race.”327
Though she reaches the same outcome as the majority, Justice Earls’s
opinion recognizes that injecting race into a case is not always
improper and sometimes absolutely essential to reach a just outcome.328 In so doing, she expressly acknowledges the collateral consequences the reasoning of her opinion will have, as a movement judge
should.
6. Movement Judges Yet to Come?
While President Biden’s nominations to the federal bench have
included a number of potential movement judges, it is too early to tell
whether this is progressive reform yielding useful results for abolition
or a deliberate attempt to appoint movement judges—though likely
the former. The process of appointing federal judges still retains many
of the institutional habits that have produced the current judiciary.329
Still, Biden’s efforts to appoint judges from more diverse personal and
professional backgrounds330 are resulting in the appointment of a
number of likely and potential movement judges.
With the nomination of Ketanji Brown Jackson to the Supreme
Court, the media is paying more attention than ever to the judicial
philosophy of a Biden nominee.331 Amidst the uncritical allusions to
326

Id.
Id. at 733.
328 See id. at 734 (“[T]he prosecutor’s references to race in his closing argument were
non-derogatory . . . and . . . intended to ensure that the jury did not allow implicit
stereotypes about the dangerousness of young [B]lack men to infect their determination of
whether defendant established that he had a reasonable fear and acted lawfully in selfdefense.”).
329 Cf. Rose Wagner, Three Judicial Nominees Make It Through Blue-Slip Debacle and
out of Committee, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Feb. 10, 2022), https://
www.courthousenews.com/three-judicial-nominees-make-it-through-blue-slip-debacle-andout-of-committee [https://perma.cc/EW5A-V8VJ] (describing Senate backlash to President
Biden’s decreased reliance on the extra-constitutional system the Senate developed to
require home-state senator approval of judicial nominees).
330 See Adrian Blanco, Biden, Who Pledged to Diversify the Supreme Court, Has
Already Made Progress on Lower Courts, WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2022, 5:00 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/01/27/federal-judge-diversity-biden/ [https://
perma.cc/5UC7-UFC9] (“The president already has muscled through the highest number
of federal judges in the first year of a presidency in four decades, with picks from a diverse
range of racial, gender and professional backgrounds.”).
331 See, e.g., Camille Busette, Why a Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson Will Make a
Difference, BROOKINGS (Feb. 25, 2022), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/how-we-rise/2022/
02/25/why-a-justice-ketanji-brown-jackson-will-make-a-difference [https://perma.cc/7CJKEEUP] (“While her potential confirmation may not alter the balance of opinion on the . . .
327
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Justice Harlan to praise the power of dissent, there is plenty of wellfounded speculation that her judicial philosophy will simply not
matter in the short term. Her previous jurisprudence is little guide in
this—after all, Justice Sotomayor was widely considered a centrist.332
But Judge Jackson’s background—both as a Black woman and as a
public defender—gives at least some indication that she could be a
movement judge on the Supreme Court.333
Looking even further forward, abolitionists must convince politicians to advance movement judges in the appointment process. That
likely will require several changes. First, politicians active in the
appointment process should actively seek to appoint judges who have
been movement lawyers. The experience of advocating for liberationist social movements is probably the best indicator that a judge is
likely to find such advocates’ arguments persuasive. Beyond that,
judges should be screened during the interviews leading up to a nomination to discern their legal philosophies, particularly whether they
are abolition constitutionalists. Beyond these obvious changes,
though, progressive politicians need to break their habit of relying
upon prestigious academic credentials334 as a shorthand for ability. If
this habit is meant to shortcut the possibility of right wing attacks on a
Court in the short term, her professional experience . . . and her personal experience as a
Black woman . . . will shape how she approaches cases before the court and how both . . .
opinions will be framed and argued.”); Editorial Board, Ketanji Brown Jackson Won’t Be
Able to Change a Radical Court. Yet., N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2022), https://
www.nytimes.com/2022/02/25/opinion/ketanji-brown-jackson-supreme-court.html [https://
perma.cc/PSQ8-B3WY] (discussing the likelihood that the conservative majority will
continue its dominance in the short term, but pointing to the potential of a strong dissenter
on the Court).
332 See Joan Biskupic, The Next President Could Tip High Court, USA TODAY (Oct. 12,
2004, 7:55 PM), https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/nation/president/
2004-09-29-election-court-cover_x.htm [https://perma.cc/38CQ-GM4T] (“Sotomayor . . . is
known as a moderate jurist and could represent a bipartisan choice: She was tapped for a
U.S. trial court seat by the first President Bush, then elevated to the appeals court by
Clinton.”); Who Will Replace Justice Souter?, ABA J. (May 1, 2009, 3:23 AM), https://
www.abajournal.com/news/article/who_will_replace_justice_souter [https://perma.cc/
FSA4-P428] (“A political centrist, the Bronx-born Sotomayor has been regarded as a
potential high court nominee by several presidents, both Republican and Democrat.”).
333 See Patricia Mazzei & Charlie Savage, For Ketanji Brown Jackson, View of Criminal
Justice Was Shaped by Family, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/
01/30/us/politics/supreme-court-ketanji-brown-jackson.html [https://perma.cc/9KYA-S63B]
(discussing how Judge Jackson’s background—including her uncle’s life sentence on a
cocaine charge and her work as a federal public defender—could shape her jurisprudence).
334 See Elena Mejia & Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux, How Biden Is Reshaping the Courts,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHt (Dec. 7, 2021), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-biden-isreshaping-the-courts [https://perma.cc/3WNM-UZ4X] (“Biden’s appointees aren’t diverse
on every metric, though. We found that his judges are more likely to have attended the
country’s most prestigious universities and law schools than judges appointed by past
presidents.”).
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candidate’s credentials, it has clearly failed to prevent bad faith criticism of Judge Jackson.335 Movement judges must put in significant
work to shift the law to a more equitable state. It is only fair that we
ask politicians to be as thorough in evaluating them, looking to career
accomplishments and ability rather than decades-old gold stars on
their resumes. We are presently in the midst of a shift in nominating
philosophy for the federal bench. While that shift is likely to produce
more movement judges, it alone does not mark a clear commitment to
doing so. While there is significant cause for hope that this shift marks
an improvement, a firm commitment to appoint movement judges in
the abolitionist mold would be preferable.
C. Abolition Constitutionalism: Why Movement Judges Matter
The core philosophy of a movement judge is abolition constitutionalism. Abolition constitutionalism blends democratic elements of
both originalism and progressive constitutionalism.336 It recognizes
that—due to the compromises inherent to conventions and legislatures—all constitutional provisions were subject to some range of
original public meanings.337 These all represent possible modern interpretations and can shift based on democratic principles; the interpretation of the Constitution is neither frozen by the dead hand of the
past nor left entirely to the discretion of judges. By contrast,
originalism’s promise lies in its ability to consider the democratic
processes of the past, but its great failing is its authoritarian tendency
to treat the results of those processes as static to the point of suicidepact constitutionalism. Progressive constitutionalism’s promise lies in
its responsiveness to the democratic goals of the present, but its great
failing is its reliance on judicial authoritarianism to justify those goals
by whatever means necessary. Abolition constitutionalism cares
deeply about both the democratic processes of the past and the democratic goals of the present, seeking to actualize those present goals
335 See Chloe Simon & Madeleine Davison, Tucker Carlson’s Racist Attacks on Judge
Ketanji Brown Jackson Are Only the Latest Examples of His White Supremacist Ideology,
MEDIA MATTERS (Mar. 3, 2022, 4:51 PM), https://www.mediamatters.org/tucker-carlson/
tucker-carlsons-racist-attacks-judge-ketanji-brown-jackson-are-only-latest-examples
[https://perma.cc/Q247-BZ64] (detailing a number of ill-founded criticisms Tucker Carlson
leveled against the Harvard-educated Judge Jackson, including a demand to see her LSAT
score).
336 See Bernard E. Harcourt, The Critique and Praxis of Rights, 92 U. COLO. L. REV.
975, 983 (2021) (looking to an originalism that considers the views of the Reconstruction
Congress as a potential legal foundation for efforts to eliminate punitive excesses).
337 See Roberts, supra note 3, at 49–50 (“Deep disputes among antebellum abolitionists
over the original Constitution’s stance on slavery presage the differences among
contemporary abolitionists on the meaning and utility of constitutional law.”).
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through the promises of the past.338 This Section will first outline
some of the interpretations and consequences of abolition constitutionalism,339 then address some of the anti-democratic trends in contemporary case law which abolition constitutionalism could
ameliorate.
1. The Reconstruction Amendments: The Powerhouse of Abolition
Constitutionalism
Abolition constitutionalism’s concern for the democratic
processes that produced the Constitution is especially important when
interpreting the Reconstruction Amendments. The Amendments had
a great range of original interpretations, from those of their drafters
and fellow abolitionists, to those of President Johnson and Southern
Democrats, to those of newly freed Black Americans.340 The Supreme
Court of the late nineteenth century largely adopted President
Johnson’s constrained interpretation of the Reconstruction
Amendments, rendering them relatively toothless.341 By contrast, congressional Republicans believed the amendments to enact several
strong, overlapping protections.342
The Thirteenth Amendment abolishes not only slavery but also
its badges and incidents—those legal and social stigma which were
necessary to its maintenance and could aid in its return.343 This concept—and Congress’s power to legislate to enforce emancipation—
are broad enough to reach police and prison abolition, guarantee
reproductive rights, and support reparations.344 The Fourteenth
Amendment includes several strong protections, including what we
now know as substantive due process, incorporation of the Bill of
338 See Evan D. Bernick, Antisubjugation and the Equal Protection of the Laws, 110
GEO. L.J. 1, 8–10 (2021) (exploring the Equal Protection Clause’s original understanding
as a guarantee of protection in contrast to its modern anti-discrimination interpretation).
339 I address the historical background of the Reconstruction Amendments more fully in
The Antiracist Constitution, 102 B.U. L. REV. 87, 130–41 (2022).
340 See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 3, at 65–70 (discussing contemporary and subsequent
disagreement of the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment’s Punishment Clause).
341 See, e.g., The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); The Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
342 See Hasbrouck, supra note 339, at 142–62 (discussing the ways in which protections
against the badges and incidents of slavery, of the privileges or immunities of the law, of
the equal protection of the laws, and of the due process of law interact, often protecting the
same interest under multiple rights).
343 See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968) (“Surely Congress has the
power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine what are the badges and
the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into effective
legislation.”).
344 See Hasbrouck, supra note 339 at 133 (laying out the arguments for legislation
protecting all of these interests under the Thirteenth Amendment’s enforcement clause).
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Rights and other fundamental rights, and an affirmative duty for governments to protect the people from violence and discrimination.345
The language of the Reconstruction Amendments’ enforcement
clauses was meant to invoke an extremely lenient standard of review
familiar to the judiciary of the nineteenth century.346 This would have
supported a broad range of color-conscious remedies that the modern
Court decries.
These broad protections were meant to support the complete
reconstruction of American society into an integrated democracy.
Congress and—to a lesser degree—the courts were to have the power
to bring about the political, civil, economic, and social equality necessary to fully realize the citizenship of formerly enslaved Black people.
Reconstruction, in this sense, failed. Abolition constitutionalism envisions a restoration of the intended power of the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to allow the resumption and
completion of the Reconstruction project. It is the role of movement
judges to incorporate this project back into contemporary
jurisprudence.
2. Diagnosing the Anti-Democratic Trends of Modern
Constitutional Law
Recently, federal courts have issued a wide array of antidemocratic decisions across various bodies of law. Our judiciary suffocates zealous resistance by concerning itself with precedent instead of
progress.347 Recent anti-democratic rulings in the areas of voting
rights, qualified immunity, labor rights, and the availability of raceconscious remedies highlight the urgency of bringing movement
judges onto the bench.
In Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee,348 Justice Alito
effectively gutted the Voting Rights Act by endorsing the voter sup345

See id. at 137 (exploring the breadth of the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections).
See Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1801, 1810 (2010)
(arguing that Congress intended its enforcement of the Reconstruction Amendments to be
limited only by a standard that evaluated the legitimacy of its ends, the appropriateness of
its means, and whether the act was otherwise prohibited).
347 See Michael D. Shear, Stacy Cowley & Alan Rappeport, Biden’s Push for Equity in
Government Hits Legal and Political Roadblocks, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2021), https://
www.nytimes.com/2021/06/26/us/politics/biden-racial-equity.html [https://perma.cc/CFZ6UVW2] (“No part of Mr. Biden’s agenda has been as ambitious as his attempt to embrace
racial considerations when making decisions. It pushes against limits set by the Supreme
Court, which say programs based on race must be ‘narrowly tailored’ to accomplish a
‘compelling governmental interest.’”).
348 141 S. Ct. 2321 (2021).
346
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pression strategy of death by a thousand cuts.349 White supremacist
legislatures have demonstrated their ability to target their suppression
efforts against Black voters with “surgical precision.”350 Just in the
first half of 2021, state legislatures passed laws to restrict mail-in
voting, impose voter ID requirements, purge voter rolls, and erect
barriers to voter registration.351 Movement judges could apply an abolition constitutionalist interpretation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments to overturn these blatantly discriminatory laws. Movement judges’ refusal to artificially narrow their view of the law and
facts would allow consideration of the full constellation of laws in a
discriminatory regime rather than viewing each piece unto itself and
concluding that each law independently does not cross the line.
Keller v. Fleming 352 is no aberration in the nightmare of bad
Fourth Amendment and qualified immunity decisions.353 Police
officers encountered a mentally infirm man walking in the road, transported him to the county line because they could not determine where
his home was, and released him; that night, he was struck and killed
by a car while walking back along the road.354 While the court did
determine that Deputy Fleming violated Gerald Simpson’s Fourth
Amendment rights by seizing him without any clear exception to the
warrant requirement,355 it nonetheless found that this was not clearly
established law.356 Even without rejecting the doctrine of qualified
immunity, movement judges could reject its application in a case such
349 See Elie Mystal, Bigots Have Finally Accomplished Their Goal of Gutting the Voting
Rights Act, NATION (July 2, 2021), https://www.thenation.com/article/politics/voting-rightsarizona-court [https://perma.cc/A9AP-CDY6] (“[One] percent of [Brown], [Black], and
Native American voters cast votes in the wrong precinct (votes that can now be completely
discarded in Arizona), while .5 percent of white voters did. Alito says that this disparity is
too small to matter for the Voting Rights Act.”).
350 N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 214 (4th Cir. 2016).
351 See Voting Laws Roundup: May 2021, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (May 28, 2021),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/voting-laws-roundup-may-2021
[https://perma.cc/24D9-4MHW] (cataloging widespread voter suppression efforts in state
legislatures).
352 952 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2020).
353 See Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court’s Quiet Expansion of Qualified Immunity, 100
MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 62, 77 (2016) (“Given the Court’s tendency to qualify its
precedents and thereby covertly expand the qualified immunity defense, it would not be
. . . surprising to find future § 1983 decisions citing Heien in referring to qualified immunity
as a ‘forgiving’ defense and . . . dismissing a government actor’s misunderstanding of
constitutional doctrine as merely ‘sloppy’ rather than ‘plainly incompetent.’”).
354 See Keller, 952 F.3d at 219–20 (describing the events leading to Gerald Simpson’s
death).
355 See id. at 223–24.
356 See id. at 226 (“Deputy Fleming’s qualified immunity defense as to Plaintiffs’ Fourth
Amendment claim prevails because Plaintiffs failed to prove that a reasonable officer like
Fleming would have understood his actions violated clearly established law.”).
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as this—just as Judge Dennis did in dissent.357 Of course, movement
judges can—and do358—call the doctrine into question, and could
eliminate it if they commanded or persuaded a majority on the
Supreme Court.359
Workers’ rights have suffered repeated defeats from the Roberts
Court.360 In Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, the Court ignored the
NLRB’s understanding of the National Labor Relations Act as protecting collective worker action both in the workplace and the courtroom to instead enforce mandatory—and individual—arbitration
clauses under the Federal Arbitration Act.361 The Roberts Court’s
protection of arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act takes on a
quasi-constitutional character, bowling over even later, robust statutory regimes.362 This pro-corporate jurisprudence is ripe for challenge
by movement judges. The abolition constitutionalist conception of due
process is broad enough to support a challenge to statutory regimes
that amount to a denial of any process whatsoever in many cases.363
357 See id. at 228 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (“Accepting the facts that the district court
found to be genuinely disputed, there is simply no legitimate government interest against
which to balance the significant intrusion posed by Deputy Fleming’s decision to seize
Simpson and dump him in the next jurisdiction without his valid consent.”).
358 See Jamison v. McClendon, 476 F. Supp. 3d 386, 419 (S.D. Miss. 2020) (calling upon
the Supreme Court to relegate qualified immunity to the “dustbin of history”).
359 Qualified immunity is a doctrine capable of demonstrating the need for movement
judges rather than merely progressive judges. “The overly deferential doctrine’s sources
are not found in the notoriously conservative Courts of Chief Justice Burger or Chief
Justice Rehnquist. Rather, Chief Justice Earl Warren penned the two opinions that
spawned the doctrine.” Janet C. Hoeffel, The Warren Court and the Birth of the Reasonably
Unreasonable Police Officer, 49 STETSON L. REV. 289, 312 (2020).
360 See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018); Cedar Point Nursery v.
Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063 (2021).
361 See Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1619 (“This Court has never read a right to class
actions into the NLRA—and for [seventy-five years] neither did the National Labor
Relations Board. Far from conflicting, the Arbitration Act and the NLRA have long
enjoyed separate spheres of influence and neither permits this Court to declare the parties’
agreements unlawful.”).
362 See WHITEHOUSE, supra note 10, at 9 (“The Roberts Five’s pro-corporate policy
preference has been particularly evident in aggressive judicial expansion of the Federal
Arbitration Act of 1925 (FAA). Their decisions have made this an avenue for powerful and
wealthy interests to systematically deny ordinary individuals, like employees and
customers, access to juries of their peers when wronged.”); Paul R. Verkuil, The Supreme
Court’s Doublethink on Arbitration and Administration, REGUL. REV. (Apr. 27, 2020),
https://www.theregreview.org/2020/04/27/verkuil-supreme-courts-doublethink-arbitrationadministration [https://perma.cc/RTS6-NKVY] (“Epic Systems stands for the proposition
that the interests of the FAA and arbitration clauses are stronger than the administrative
structure undergirding federal labor law.”).
363 See Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Arbitration Stymies Progress Towards Justice in
Employment Law: Where to, #MeToo?, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 155, 179 (2019)
(“[M]any employment claims cannot feasibly be brought individually. Such claims might be
too costly, particularly in relation to expected monetary relief; employees might not even
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Finally, movement judges could apply Congress’s intended standard of review to its power to enact race-conscious remedies under
the Reconstruction Amendments. This is particularly relevant given
the tendency of reactionary judges to overturn such programs on a
theory of color-blind constitutionalism.364 Recently, the Biden
Administration sought to correct an obvious discrepancy in the distribution of coronavirus pandemic relief and was promptly rebuffed by
courts ruling that earmarking funds for Black farmers was discriminatory against white farmers.365 The irony of using the Equal Protection
Clause to justify denying relief to Black farmers is especially bitter,
and drives home the need for movement judges to apply abolition
constitutionalist interpretations to redress historic harms.
CONCLUSION
“In a racially divided society majority rule is not a reliable instrument
of democracy.”
—Lani Guinier, 2020366
Movement judges have tremendous potential to reshape and
reinforce our democracy. That democratic organization must extend
beyond simply voting for representatives on election day if it is to
meaningfully protect the rights of all Americans. Institutions that concentrate political, economic, or social power in the hands of the few
are necessarily contrary to democracy. The exclusionary tendency
belongs, rather, to oligarchy. That tendency is alive and well in
America, seen in the pervasive laws advancing disparate benefits and
burdens along white supremacist lines and the jurisprudence that
upholds those laws.
Our Constitution contains an antidote for the oligarchic poison in
American society: the Reconstruction Amendments. The
Reconstruction Amendments were a massive undertaking to advance
democracy. Understood in their abolitionist context, they contain
powerful guarantees for all Americans, but especially for marginalized
realize they had been harmed or that the harm was unlawful; or [many] might hesitate to
file due to fear of retaliation by their employer or others.”).
364 See Randall Kennedy, Colorblind Constitutionalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 5–6
(2013) (charting the rise of Harlan’s dissent in Plessy as a bludgeon against race-conscious
remedies beginning in the 1980s).
365 See Reiley, supra note 69 (describing an injunction blocking as discriminatory—a
measure meant to redress the inequitable distribution of previous coronavirus debt relief
to farmers by earmarking some federal aid for Black farmers).
366 Lani Guinier, Second Proms and Second Primaries: The Limits of Majority Rule,
BOS. REV. (Mar. 11, 2020), https://bostonreview.net/articles/lani-guinier-second-promsand-second-primaries-limits-majority-rule [https://perma.cc/FBJ3-ZE3N].
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communities. Movement judges, acting in solidarity with those communities and movements advocating for their rights and interests, can
apply the Reconstruction Amendments to advance those interests—
and with them, the cause of democracy itself. Completing the
Reconstruction project will require movement judges.
The Biden Administration’s commitment to diversifying the federal bench—both in terms of personal and professional backgrounds—is an admirable beginning. It is likely that even without a
deliberate effort to select movement judges, more will be appointed
through this process than through that employed by recent administrations. But this is not enough to truly bring about substantive justice
in the judiciary. The courts are full of former prosecutors and corporate attorneys, many of whom continue to operate in solidarity with
their former colleagues and clients. We need a counterweight to this—
judges willing to hear cases in solidarity with mass social movements
and marginalized communities, ruling and writing along abolition constitutionalist lines of reasoning. We need movement judges.

